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PRODUCT SIMULATION: A RIGHT OR A WRONG?
On March 9, 1964 the Supreme Court handed down the companion
cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.* and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.** Justice Black, speaking for the Court, ruled that it was not
consonant with the federal patent laws for the State of Illinois to enjoin the
copying of an unpatented or unpatentable article, irrespective of whether the
copying resulted in confusion of the public. Because of the implications of these
cases and their potential effect on several related areas of the law, the Editors
of the Columbia Law Review have invited several eminent scholars to comment
upon the opinions.
The effect of the Supreme Court decisions in the Sears and Compco
cases is neither as disastrous as many who espouse greater design pro-
tection fear nor as comforting as many who eschew such protection hope.
DAPHNE R. LEEDS
it two companion rulings during its last terin the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have placed product simulation on a constitutional pedestal and
accorded it a privileged status. These rulings, couched in the absolute
and unqualified language that is the hallmnark of Justice Black's juristic
art, nay portend revolutional changes in the law of unfair competition.
MILTON HANDLER
When the Supreme Court released the Sears and Compco decisions it
seemed, at first glance, that the law of unfair competition and related
fields had become "disaster areas." The roof had seemingly fallen in onl
a vast structure of federal and state precedents laboriously built up since
the days of the Court's famous decision in the International News case.
WALTER J. DEREN3ERG
Unless one chooses to assail the whole concept of freedom of imitative
competition the Court's general conclusion, as stated in the Sears opinion,
seems to be unassailable.
RALP r S. BROWN, JR.
It is crucial to observe, however, that while broad opinions generally
preempting state monopolies nay well be handed down, Sears and Compco
are certainly not such opinions. They are the easy cases where the state
protection was substantively inconsistent with the federal statute.
PAUL BENDER
* 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
** 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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DAPHNE R. LEEDS*
The effect of the Supreme Court decisions in the Sears' and CoMpco2
cases is neither as disastrous as many who espouse greater design protection
fear nor as comforting as many who eschew such protection hope. Both cases
involved the copying of an unpatentable article of commerce in its entirety-
not a nonfunctional feature that had acquired a secondary meaning. The Sears
case represents merely the application of old principle in a somewhat different
context. It does not establish a new principle. The question presented was
whether a competitor who copies an unpatentable article and sells it in com-
petition with the originator's article is guilty of unfair competition.
The article-a pole lamp-Twas the subject of invalid mechanical and
design patents. It was copied in its entirety and sold in labeled cartons, but
without identification tags attached to the lamp, at a retail price equal to the
originator's wholesale price. There was some evidence of public confusion
resulting from the appearance of the two articles, but there was no evidence
that such confusion resulted from the copying of a nonfunctional feature
which had acquired a secondary meaning. There was no evidence of palming off.
A general rule concerning unprivileged imitation of the appearance of
goods has evolved through the years on a case by case basis; today it contains
some rather well-defined principles. As tentatively set forth in the Restate-
ment of Torts the rule reads:
One markets his goods with an unprivileged imitation of the physi-
cal appearance of another's goods, under the rule stated in § 711,
if he copies or imitates the configuration of the goods, the style or
design of the goods, or the dress of the goods, or the conformation of
the package for the goods of the other, and his goods are of the same
class and sold in the same market as those of the other, and
(a) he procured or obtained access to the other's goods by
improper means for the purpose of copying or imitating them; or
(b) he had promised that he would not copy or imitate the
other's goods; or(c) the imitated feature of the other's goods has acquired gen-
erally in the market a special significance identifying the goods as his,
and the actor's copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective pur-
chasers to regard them as those of the other, and,
(i) the copied or imitated feature is nonfunctional, or
(ii) if the copied or imitated feature is fitnctional, the actor
does not take reasonable steps to distinguish his goods from
those of the other.3
The decision in the Sears case is not inconsistent with this rule, since the
Reporter of RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, division 9, part I'; former Assistant
Commissioner of Patents in charge of Trademarks.
1. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3. This formulation of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 741 (Elements of Un-
privileged Imitation) has not as yet been incorporated into a tentative draft.
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subject copied was the entire article, and thus functional. It was sold in cartons
which were labeled-though there was no identification on the lamp itself. The
Court observed in the final footnote that Illinois, where the case arose, had not
seen fit to impose liability on sellers who did not label their goods.4
The court of appeals, in its opinion,5 had broadened Illinois law beyond
any previous case involving similar circumstances. In so doing, it overlooked
the established principle that sharing in the good will of an article which is
unprotected by patent is the exercise of a right possessed by all. Moreover, it
seems to have disregarded the fact that in granting the injunction against
further copying of an unpatented article under the guise of unfair competition,
the court was granting plaintiff a right as broad as a patent and unlimited
as to time.
Some of Justice Black's reasoning is rather startling inasmuch as his
conclusions seem to be based on the "[F]ederal policy, found in Art. I, § 8,
cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in
the public domain."6 The patent and copyright laws, however, allow no such
"access." The right to copy stems from the common law; the patent and copy-
right laws are exceptions to that right. His analysis further seems to be based
on a theory of federal preemption and occupation of the field which is contrary
to the implications of the Court's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.7 The ultimate
result in the case, however, is sound and is consonant with the body of
established law.
The decision should not be interpreted as having any applicability to cases
involving distinctive packages and dress of goods. The Court carefully pointed
out that a state may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods be
labeled or that other steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled
as to source, "just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks,
labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others,
by imitating such marldngs, from misleading purchasers as to the source of
the goods."8 In other words, a particular feature whose sole function is to
identify and distinguish the user's article and which, in fact, does identify and
distinguish, will continue to be protected as a device-trademark.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Cornpco case may cause some
difficulty in the future'-not because it differs substantively from the Sears
case, but because it contains statements that may lead lower courts astray in
cases involving substantially different facts. Compco involved a fluorescent
4. To this extent the Illinois law may not be consistent with the general rule.
5. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
6. 376 U.S. at 237.
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1824) : "[W]ithin the limits of the state, a patent under
the local law would be just as effectual."
8. 376 U.S. at 232. (Emphasis added.)
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lighting fixture containing a particular kind of reflector that was the subject
of an invalid design patent and a refused mechanical patent. A competitor
had copied the fixture, including the reflector with cross-ribs designed to
provide both strength and attractiveness, and sold it in a clearly marked con-
tainer. The district court found:
(a) the overall appearance of the copier's fixture was the same, to
the ordinary observer, as the appearance of the originator's;
(b) the appearance of the fixture had the capacity to identify and
did so identify the originator in the trade;
(c) the concurrent sale of the two fixtures was likely to cause con-
fusion in the trade; and
(d) actual confusion did occur.9
There was no evidence of palming off.
The court of appeals stated that there was no clear error in the district
court's findings. The evidence supported the conclusion that the reflector,
though functional, did have the capacity to identify and did identify the
originator in the trade, and there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the finding of likelihood of confusion. The court did not comment
on the evidence of actual confusion. It observed, "the capacity of the plaintiff's
design [the overall appearance of the article] to serve the plaintiff in some-
what the manner of a trademark does constitute a 'protectable' right."'01
The case involved the copying of the overall appearance of an article of
trade and not the copying of a nonfunctional feature that had acquired a
secondary meaning. With respect to the reflector in the fixtures, the court of
appeals had noted that "several choices of ribbing were apparently available
to meet the functional needs of the product," and that the copier "did not avail
itself of the other types but instead chose precisely the same design used by
the plaintiff and followed it so closely as to make confusion likely."" The
court, however, had theretofore stated that "while a choice of ribbing to meet
the need was available, any particular choice had to be made from those types
of ribbing which would be suitable to the functional requirement,"'21 and con-
cluded that the district court's decision that the design of the cross-ribs was
functional and dictated by the limitations of the manufacturing process is "fully
supported by the evidence." 3
It has long been established principle that the appearance of an unpatented
or unpatentable article or any part thereof that is functional may not acquire
any secondary meaning rendering it subject to exclusivity.14 The copier may
9. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Conpco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 29 (7th Cir. 1962).
10. Id. at 30.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 28.
13. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
14. See J. R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods. Co., 219 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1955);
Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1957); In re Deister Con-
centrator Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 952, 289 F.2d 496 (1961).
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be required to distinguish his product by labels or other source indicia, but
the mere copying and selling of the article does not constitute, and never has
constituted, unfair competition. The Supreme Court in Compco merely under-
scored this principle.
In equating the overall design of an unpatentable article with a trademark,
the court of appeals overlooked the fact and the legal principle that a trade-
mark is adopted and used for the purpose of identifying and distinguishing the
product of one person from the products of others, whereas the functional
design of an article is adopted for utilitarian purposes. The two are not
analogous. They are not even comparable.
In this context, the "summation" of the Supreme Court was most unfor-
tunate. Justice Black stated:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made
in some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not essen-
tial to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article
copied may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the maker
to the trade, or that there may be "confusion" among purchasers as
to which article is which or as to who is the maker, may be revelant
evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as
labeling; however, and regardless of the copier's motives, neither
these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability
for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.'5
In light of the record in this case, the Court was merely saying that the fact
that the copied fixture, or the reflector, could have been made in some other
way (as the court of appeals observed), or that the particular design of the
fixture has no effect upon its utilitarian value, or that the design of the fixture
may identify its maker to the trade, or that purchasers may not be able to
tell just by looking at the fixture itself who made it, may be relevant for the
purpose of requiring reasonable steps to distinguish the copier's fixture. They
do not, however, alter the established principle that an unpatented or un-
patentable article may be freely copied, and the design of the article may not
acquire such significance as would entitle it to exclusive appropriation, regard-
less of the copier's motives.
Thus, when read in the context of the record, and it should not be other-
wise read, this "summation" does not mean that the originator is without
recourse to restrain the palming off of the copy. Nor does the decision mean
that the Supreme Court has overruled that considerable body of law which
subjects to liability one who copies a nonfunctional feature of another's goods
when such feature serves only the purpose of indicating source of the goods
and when its copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective purchasers to
regard them as those of the other.
15. 376 U.S. at 238.
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More than a half-century ago, when the law of unfair competition was yet
in its infancy, Justice Holmes drew a pregnant distinction between sharing in
the good will of a product and sharing in the good will of its producer.' A
generation later Justice Brandeis observed that:
Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-
mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.
2
The Supreme Court, however, has not always exempted product simula-
tion from judicial regulation. In the Schechter case, Chief Justice Hughes, in
synthesizing the law of unfair competition as it then existed, asserted:
"Unfair competition," as known to the common law, is a limited
concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's
goods as those of a rival trader.... In recent years its scope has been
extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own-to
misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor.
3
In this synthesis the Chief Justice relied upon the International News Service
case4 where, acting under its pre-Erie diversity jurisdiction, the Court had
held tortious the copying and sale, by I.N.S., of uncopyrighted Associated
Press news dispatches. Schechter, of course, was only a dictum, and the Chief
Justice may have indulged in an overgeneralization. As is well known, Interna-
tional News has since had a checkered career and, though never overruled,
has been essentially limited to its facts and applied only in closely related and
cognate situations.5
It is fair to say that both before and after International News, product
Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B., Columbia University, 1924; LL.B.,
1926.
This Article is based upon a section of a lecture before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York on June 18, 1964. The remainder of the lecture will be published
in the November issue of the University of Michigan Law Review.
1. See Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1910) :
The real intent of the plaintiff's bill .. . is to extend the monopoly of such trade-
mark or trade name as she may have to a monopoly of her type of bitter water, by
preventing manufacturers from telling the public in a way that will be understood
what they are copying and trying to sell. But the plaintiff has no patent for the
water, and the defendants have a right to reproduce it as nearly as they can....
If [the defendants] do not convey, but, on the contrary, exclude the notion that
they are selling the plaintiff's goods, it is a strong proposition that when the
article has a well-known name they have not the right to explain by that name
what they imitate. By doing so they are not trying to get the good will of the
name, but the good will of the goods.
2. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
3. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935).
4. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
5. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930) and cases cited in HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 948 n.7
(3d ed. 1960).
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simulation, by itself, has generally been deemed non-tortious at common law
in both state and federal courts., But at no time has it ever been suggested
that where such simulation entails sharing in the good will of the producer as
well as of the product, courts were powerless to prevent the resulting deception
by curbing the imitation. In two companion rulings during its last term the
Supreme Court appears to have placed product simulation on a constitutional
pedestal and accorded it a privileged status. These rulings, couched in the
absolute and unqualified language that is the hallmark of Justice Black's
juristic art, may portend revolutionary changes in the law of unfair
competition.
In the Sears7 and Compco8 cases, the Supreme Court ruled that it is
not consonant with the federal patent laws for the State of Illinois to enjoin
the copying of an unpatented or unpatentable article irrespective of whether
the copying results in confusion of the public-regardless of whether the
configuration of the article has acquired a secondary meaning or whether
the copied features are functional. These factors, according to Justice Blhck,
are irrelevant because in the absence of a patent the article is in the public
domain and may therefore be freely imitated.9
The Sears case concerned a pole lamp originally made by the plaintiff,
who had secured design and mechanical patents on it. Sears, Roebuck made a
Chinese copy of the lamp and proceeded to sell it at retail for a price practically
equivalent to Stiffel's wholesale price. Stiffel's complaint alleged patent
infringement and unfair competition. After finding the patents invalid for want
of invention,' 0 the district court, applying its view of Illinois law, held that
there was some actual confusion as well as a likelihood of confusion stemming
from the substantial identity of the two lamps. There was no finding of
secondary meaning in the appearance of the product, and the copied features
appear to have been functional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment granting an injunction, ordering an accounting for profits,
and awarding damages."-
In Cor pco the imitated article was a cross-ribbed reflector used in a
fluorescent lighting fixture on which a design patent had been secured and
a mechanical patent refused. The suit was in two counts for patent infringe-
ment and unfair competition. Again, the design patent was held invalid. After
finding secondary meaning and actual, as well as likely, confusion, the district
6. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., supra note 5.
7. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
8. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).9. "To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl.
8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain." Id. at 237.10. See summary of the district court's unreported opinion in Stiffel Co. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 116 (7th Cir. 1963).
11. Id. at 118.
1184 (Vol. 64:1183
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court awarded an injunction and an accounting.12 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.' s
The Supreme Court's rationale proceeds along the traditional lines of
federal preemption. The federal patent system, specifically authorized by the
Constitution,14 establishes a uniform federal standard for the protection
of invention and the preservation of free competition. To give patent-like
protection under state law to an article incapable of a patent grant runs
counter to federal policy and is accordingly unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause.15 Justice Black apparently views the patent law as embody-
ing a congressional, if not a constitutional,1 6 decision to grant to the public
complete freedom to copy all articles not of sufficient inventiveness to be
patentable.' 7 According to the Court, the state's interest in prohibiting fraud
and preventing confusion of the purchasing public may be achieved by other
means, such as compulsory labeling,'8 but federal law does not permit the
states, in the guise of enjoining unfair competition, to restrain the copying
of an unpatented article. The short of the rulings is that the recognition by
the states of any rights in anything in the public domain conflicts with
federal law.
Ever since Darcy v. Allein' 9 was decided in 1602, the English common
law has denied its sanction to either a crown or a legislative" grant of
monopoly over the manufacture and sale of ordinary articles of trade lacking
any element of invention. It is no radical extension of doctrine under the
American constitutional system to hold that such judge-created monopolies
are equally impermissible.21 Indeed, judge-made monopolies entail a greater
threat to our competitive institutions since, unlike patents, their creation is
not restricted to products embodying invention and discovery, there is no
time limitation on their duration, and there is no eventual dedication to the
public. 22 Accordingly, it has long been established that it is not tortious to
12. See summary of the district court's unreported opinion in Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
13. Ibid.
14. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI.
16. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) ; see Justice
Black's dissent in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522(1964).
17. "To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying
of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit
the State to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to
the public"' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
18. Id. at 232.
19. 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
20. See the Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. I, c. 3.
21. Implicit in the constitutional grant to Congress of legislative power to authorize
the issuance of patents is a denial of like power to the judiciary.
22. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
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share in the good will of a product as opposed to sharing in the good will
of its producer.23
There would, therefore, be no occasion to comment on these cases if they
went no further than Darcy v. Allein and the legion of decisions upholding
copying when there is no secondary meaning, no misrepresentation, and no
confusion of the public. What differentiates these rulings is that they seemingly
permit a sharing of the good will of the producer as well as that of his product.
To relate these decisions to the prior precedents, it may be instructive to
consider a series of hypothetical situations.
We first turn to the classic case of a naked copying of an unpatented
article absent any element of explicit or implicit misrepresentation as to
source. Justice Black's opinions reaffirm the right of imitation in these
circumstances and are in accord with settled authority.24 Suppose, however,
the copier overtly misrepresents that his product emanates from a competitor.
This type of explicit misrepresentation, palming off, has long been considered
unfair competition 25 and the Sears-Compco rule of preemption, appertaining
to the act of copying, should not affect the state's power to condemn it.26
The next hypothetical concerns duplication of an article whose configura-
tion or appearance has acquired a secondary meaning in circumstances where
confusion has occurred or is likely. Here the misrepresentation is implicit, not
overt. The crux of a secondary meaning is that the appearance of the product
identifies and distinguishes its source. The copier is thus misrepresenting the
origin of his own goods. If the imitated features are functional, the majority
of the cases27 and the Restatement28 would deny protection to the original
maker, even though it is his good will rather than that of his product which
is being shared. When the copied features are nonfunctional, however, the
general rule prior to Sears was to hold the imitation tortious. 29 Even though
an implicit misrepresentation causing public confusion may exist, Justice Black
23. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
24. E.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930).
25. E.g., Winthrop Chem. Co. v. Weinberg, 60 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1932) ; see 1 Nims,
UNFAIR CoMETITIaoN AND TRADEMARKS § 9a (4th ed. 1947) and cases cited therein.
26. "A State of course has power to impose liability upon those who, knowing that
the public is relying upon an original manufacturer's reputation for quality and integrity,
deceive the public by palming off their copies as the original." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
27. See, e.g., Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 Fed. 827 (3d Cir. 1916);
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; 1 CALMAN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 16.2 (2d ed. 1950) ; 1 Nmis, op. cit. supra note
25, § 134.
28. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 741 (1938). The Restatement prohibits copying of non-
functional features which have acquired a secondary meaning. If the imitated feature is
functional, the privilege of copying is conditional and permitted except when the copier
"does not take reasonable steps to inform prospective purchasers that the goods which
he markets are not those" of the original maker.
29. See, e.g., Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
On the subject of functionality generally see Note, 64 CoLUm. L. REV. 544 (1964).
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now tells us that the states are powerless to curb copying. All they can do is
to minimize the deception by requiring affirmative labeling. 0
Unfair competition, perhaps more than any other field in the law, neces-
sarily involves a balancing of interests. No matter how devoted we may be
to the philosophy of competition as the best instrument of economic control
in a democratic society, we all recognize that it must be conducted within
limits if it is not to destroy itself and produce the very condition it is designed
to prevent. There are thus certain practices which, by common consensus, have
been placed beyond the pale of proper competitive business behavior.8 '
There is always the danger that salutary efforts to curb business im-
proprieties may subvert the competitive process itself. Hence, the courts have
had to strike a delicate balance between the social interest in preserving com-
petition and the equally important social interest in prohibiting unfair and
deceptive practices. In our eagerness to elevate the ethical levels of business
conduct, we must never forget that unfair competition is the other side of
the antitrust coin. To attain our dual goals, we must eliminate fraud without
preventing competition; in preserving competition, we must not immunize fraud.
With respect to product imitation, the interests to be weighed are the
public's right, absent a patent grant, to imitate at will and, on the other side,
the social desirability of avoiding public confusion resulting from a misrep-
resentation as to source, whether explicit or implicit. Heretofore, imitation
has generally been permitted, as I have pointed out, where the copied feature
was functional or integral to the product, since otherwise the product could not
be made by others and there would be no competition. But when the feature
was nonfunctional-which is another way of saying that the defendant could
readily alter the appearance of the article and still compete effectively-as
was the situation before the Court in Compco, 32 there is no reason why mis-
representation should be tolerated. The restraint against copying does not
confer a product monopoly; it merely requires changes in appearance necessary
to avoid confusion.
Justice Black would harmonize these interests along totally different lines.
The thrust of the patent law is so strong, he says, that the states, under the
Constitution, may protect against the implicit misrepresentation arising from
the imitation of a product with secondary meaning only by compelling labeling
30. No one could quarrel with the decisions if compulsory labeling were sufficientto obviate the fraud. Experience, however, has taught that confusion of the public can
not always be effectively avoided by placing the name of the imitator on the imitated
article. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 424 (1916); 2 NIms,
op. cit. supra note 25, § 379a.
31. See generally Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Rxv. 175 (1936).32. The court of appeals in Compco noted that "several choices of ribbing were
apparently available to meet the functional needs of the product." 311 F.2d at 30. How-
ever, the court in affirming the district court's finding that the plaintiff's patent was invalid,did state that "the District Court's decision that the design of the cross ribs wasfunctional and dictated by the limitations of the manufacturing process is fully supportedby the evidence." Id. at 28.
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showing the correct source. Copying itself-even of nonfunctional features-
cannot be forbidden though such a prohibition may be the only effective means
of counteracting the misrepresentation. 3 Whether or not this new formulation
is preferable to the old, the fundamental question posed by these decisions is
whether it is the only balance permitted the states under our constitutional
system.
According to justice Black, nothing in the public domain may be denied
to anyone, no matter what the circumstances. In his subsequent dissent in the
Aro case, he makes his position even clearer:
The granting of patent monopolies under... constitutional authority
represents a very minor exception to the Nation's traditional policy of
a competitive business economy, such as is safeguarded by the anti-
trust laws. When articles are not patentable and therefore are in the
public domain .. . , to grant them a legally protected monopoly
offends the constitutional plan of a competitive economy .... 84
In painting with such a broad brush, he gives no weight to the traditional
power of equity to mold a decree to fit the particular facts before the court.
It is a long settled principle of equity jurisprudence, often applied in the field
of trade regulation, that a court may enjoin completely lawful conduct in
order to make its prohibition of unlawful conduct more effective. This
principle has been applied time and again by the Supreme Court in antitrust
cases, 35 and was reaffirmed as recently as two years ago in United States v.
Loew's, Inc., where justice Goldberg stated: "to ensure . . . that relief is
effectual, otherwise permissible practices connected with the acts found to
be illegal must sometimes be enjoined."3 6
Nor is this remedial doctrine limited to courts of equity. Administrative
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission likewise have a wide area
of latitude in shaping their orders.37 The remedies so framed, both by court and
commission, have frequently deprived defendants of the right to do something
that is permissible when done by everyone else-which is another way of
33. "[T]hat the design is 'nonfunctional' and not essential to the use of either
article ... can [not] furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual
acts of copying and selling." 376 U.S. at 238.
34. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964).
35. For example, in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), the
Court affirmed a decree which, in addition to enjoining leases containing tie-in provisions,
required the defendant to lease its machines to all applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis.
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944), the Court
affirmed a decree nullifying fair trade contracts in their entirety for six months even
though only portions of them were unlawful, holding that "equity has power to eradicate
the evils of a condemned scheme by prohibition of the use of admittedly valid parts of
an invalid whole." In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 461 (1940), the
Court affirmed a decree enjoining the defendant from licensing its patented fuel to jobbers
even though the licensing device "might continue to be used for some lawful purposes."
36. 371 U.S. 38, 53 (1962).
37. See, e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-31 (1957) ; which upheld
a broad FTC order as reasonably restraining lawful practices in order to prevent a con-
tinuance of unfair competition.
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saying that the defendants are being denied the right to make use of something
in the public domain. It is difficult, therefore, to understand why under the
Constitution there should be less remedial power in the states than in the
Federal Trade Commission, particularly where the object of the restraint is to
curb misrepresentation. When a court, in shaping an effective decree, in-
hibits the defendant from engaging in conduct which is otherwise entirely
lawful, it is not in any sense arrogating to itself the powers vested in the
patent office and conferring a monopoly upon the plaintiff; the only curb
on the defendant is that he alter the nonfunctional features of his goods,
but he is free to produce the same article with all of its functional character-
istics. Moreover, the restraint on copying nonfunctional elements is imposed
only when there is no alternative effective means of preventing the
misrepresentation.
Does the new doctrine apply to imitation of features other than the ap-
pearance of the article? What about trademarks? Although Justice Black
explicitly tells us that the states may continue to protect the use of trademarks
in order to avoid public confusion, the breadth of his ratio decidendi presents
some problems. Personal names,38 geographical terms 9 and descriptive
words40 are all, in a sense, in the public domain. Yet, when a secondary mean-
ing has been acquired, they have traditionally been granted trademark protec-
tion both at common law,41 and under state42 and federal43 statutes. How is
the protection of these items taken from the public domain to be squared with
the denial of protection when the product itself is copied? Is the ambit of
these decisions restricted to the subject matter of the patent and copyright
laws, or does it extend to anything in the public domain which is available to
all of mankind? If there be any such distinction, what is its rationale?
Suppose a manufacturer has a valuable trade secret which one of his
competitors wrongfully procures. Is this another area, though not explicitly
mentioned in Sears or Compco, in which a re-evaluation of well settled legal
principles is required? By definition, a trade secret is not patented; frequently
it is unpatentable. Yet so long as secrecy is maintained, relief will be
afforded against misappropriation. 44 Recovery is not limited to money dam-
38. See 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 27, § 85.2; 1 NIms, op. cit. stpra note 25,§§ 67-81; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 720 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 722 (1938).
39. See 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. stipra note 27, § 72; 1 NIms, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 98-
115; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 720 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
40. See 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 27, § 71; I NIms, op. cit. supra note 25,
§§ 200-210; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 720 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) ; RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 721 (1938).
41. See generally Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis
and Synthesis, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 168, 759 (1930).
42. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 361(e).
43. See Lanham Act § 2(f), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1959).
44. See, e.g., Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868). See generally 2 CALLIMAN,
op. cit. supra note 27, §§ 51-59; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 757-59 (1938).
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ages; an injunction will issue against a repetition of the wrong, and, in addition,
against the use of the secret itself. In other words, the courts are granting a
limited monopoly in an unpatented article or process against a wrongdoer
who, by his conduct, has forfeited the right available to everyone else to use
the subject matter of the secret when fairly discovered. Has this body of
law also been discarded by Sears and Compco?
This brings me to my last hypothetical-state protection of trade dress
or distinctive packaging. Here Justice Black obviates the need for guesswork
as to the application of the Sears principle; the Court explicitly preserves
the state's power to protect the use of "distinctive dress in the packaging of
goods.145 Evidently the Justices do not view the uniform federal patent policy
as requiring preemption of state regulation in this area, notwithstanding the
fact that elements of trade dress emanate from the public domain and to some
extent may be the subject of design patents.46
In holding that the states cannot place any limitations on that which is in
the common domain, the Court's opinions may also affect the law of anti-
trust itself. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.,47 Chief Justice Stone
established the principle that neither estoppel nor private contract may prevent
the assignor of a patent from defending himself in an infringement suit by
alleging that the infringing device was in the public domain. Now we are told
that the law of torts as well may not restrict the use of that which is in the
public domain. Does this mean that ancillary covenants not to compete, which
restrict economic activities otherwise open to all, are no longer valid?
Despite Justice Black's absolute language, I find it hard to believe that
the Court intended to jettison the large body of state law of unfair competi-
tion which has developed over the last century and a half. This is particularly
so since, as Justice Brandeis pointed out in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co.,48 the Erie doctrine makes the state law controlling in unfair competition
litigation when brought in the federal courts under the diversity jurisdiction.
The anomalous situation to which we now have been brought is that, although
the states theoretically have the last word on the substantive law, we will, in
fact, have to look to the federal courts for the crucial decisions concerning the
permissible scope of state regulation under the supremacy clause. It is perhaps
worthy of note that for a century and three-quarters it has not even as much
as been intimated that state law must conform to the implied policy postulates
which the Court for the first time discerns in the federal patent laws. I would
hope that, as the case by case explication of Sears and Compco unfolds in the
vast amount of litigation these cases will inevitably spawn,40 limits will be
45. 376 U.S. at 232.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1959).
47. 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
48. 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938).
49. See, e.g., Edward H. Wood Associates v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964);
Capital Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup.
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set on the absolutes found in these opinions, and that state courts in the
economic area will be accorded the same deference as is shown state legisla-
tures by a Court that so enthusiastically associates itself with the Holmes-
Brandeis-Stone reading of the fourteenth amendment.50 While competition
unquestionably is "an ease to the people,"51 the effective prevention of fraud
upon the public is one of the most ancient and mobile responsibilities of the
judiciary.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in International News,52 and Judge Learned
Hand for the court in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,53 observed that
judges are ill-equipped to create new rights or recognize new property inter-
ests, since they are unable to engage in the investigation or provide the
limitations and safeguards which only a legislative body is in a position to
afford. Are not the courts equally ill-equipped without investigation and
safeguards to uproot from our law rights which have been long-recognized and
effectively protected?
It seems worth remembering in this turbulent and agonizing century that
change is not always synonymous with progress.
Ct., 1964) ; New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc.,
141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1964), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d
885 (2d Dep't 1964); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q.
461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 1, 1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 141
U.S.P.Q. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, April 15, 1964) ; Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Docu-
mentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 726, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct 1964).
50. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
51. The Schoolmaster Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (C.P. 1410).
52. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264-67 (1918).
53. 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
1964]
HeinOnline -- 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1191 1964
WALTER J. DERENBERG*
When the Supreme Court released the Sears and Compco decisions it
seemed, at first glance, that the law of unfair competition and related fields
had become "disaster areas." The roof had seemingly fallen in on a .vast
structure of federal and state precedents laboriously built up since the days
of the Court's famous decision in the International News case.' The purpose
of this article is to pierce through the confusion and disruption caused by these
two cases and to appraise the more permanent aftereffects of the holdings and
especially of certain sweeping dicta in both opinions.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, let it be stated at the outset that
there was nothing unusual about the two cases in their early stages. They
were but two among hundreds of similar cases in which patent owners sought
protection against "slavish imitation" of their products and failed to secure
it under the law of unfair competition once the patent had been declared in-
valid or had expired. Nor has it ever been suggested that under the guise
of state law, a competitor could or should be prevented from using an in-
vention that always had been or had become part of the public domain.
Since the lower court's decisions in both cases---particularly in Sears-
went too far in several respects, it was not surprising that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The court of appeals had found unfair competition
without adequate proof of secondary meaning and without any showing
that the competitor had copied not only functional but nonfunctional features
of the equipment as well. Moreover, it granted broad injunctive relief against
further manufacture of the entire article just as if patent infringement had been
present.
Nevertheless, careful observers noted that the Court had consistently
declined to review a large number of previous decisions in which unsuccessful
plaintiffs, rather than defendants, had petitioned. The very fact that the Court
had singled out these cases for review, in itself, justified forebodings that in
its first decisions concerning product simulation since the Shredded Wheat
case8 of twenty-five years ago, the Court would reverse the lower court, at
least with regard to the scope of relief to which the plaintiffs had been held
entitled under Illinois law of unfair competition as a result of the Seventh
Circuit's application of "principles of old fashioned" commercial honesty.4
Those who were present during the oral argument of the cases were left
* Professor of Law, New York University. Member of the New York Bar.
1. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
2. Stiffel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
3. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
4. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962), quoting
Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack Inc., 180 F.2d 200, 206 (7th Cir. 1950) (Duffy, 3.) :
"In all cases of unfair competition, it is principles of old fashioned honesty which are
controlling."
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under no illusion-the Court would express little sympathy with the lower
court's decisions. Few anticipated, however, that the Court would take this
opportunity to sanction every form of product simulation, no matter how
"unfair," on the ground that precluding the copying of an unpatented or
uncopyrighted product would run afoul of "federal patent policy" and would
conflict with the "limited times" provision of article I, section 8, of the Con-
stitution.5 Rather than reverse the lower court on the ground that there had
been no adequate showing of "palming off," imitation of "nonfunctional"
features, or "secondary meaning," the Court looked upon the issues before it
from the broader viewpoint of constitutional and statutory "preemption" and
thereby appeared to have foreclosed any possibility of state court protection
against product simulation. Only Justice Harlan, in a brief concurring opinion,
suggested that states should be given "more leeway" in "unfair competition
copying cases":
If copying is found, other than by an inference arising from the mere
act of copying, to have been undertaken with the dominant purpose
and effect of palming off one's goods as those of another or of con-
fusing customers as to the source of such goods, I see no reason why
the State may not impose reasonable restrictions on the future
"copying" itself. Vindication of the paramount federal interest at
stake does not require a State to tolerate such specifically oriented
predatory business practices."
But even if it now had to be conceded that cases involving "Chinese copying"
or "slavish imitation" were to be decided solely on the basis of constitutional
preemption, it would still remain doubtful whether the patent and the copy-
right "monopolies" should be treated alike in this respect. As was recently
observed in a thought provoking study on the constitutional aspects of
copyright law:
American legal thinking on the subject of intellectual property has
suffered, ab initio, from the lazy man's impulse to treat patents and
copyrights alike, without a careful consideration of the vital differ-
ences between them.7
5. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing, for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries!'
6. 376 U.S. 225, 239. Even the Department of Justice did not ask for or even suggest
as extreme an approach as was later embodied in the Court's opinion.
There may be cases where a court might conclude that a prohibition against
copying was the only way to provide effective relief. Such a decree might bejustified if there were no feasible means to differentiate between the parties' goods,
except by differences in appearance; if prior efforts to stop the deception by
narrower relief had been unsuccessful; or if the counterbalancing public interest
in the copied feature is insignificant.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 36, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
7. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry Into the Constitutional
Distribution of Powers Over the Law of Literary Property in the United States, 9 BULL.
COPYRIGHT S0C'Y 102, 194, 196 n.4 (1962).
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Even a glance at the Copyright Act of 1909, and particularly Section 2 thereof,8
will indicate that different standards of constitutional and congressional
preemption should apply with regard to copyright as compared with patent
law. The patent statute contains no reservation of a common-law right in
undisclosed materials, while common-law copyright protection is expressly
reserved until "general publication" and may in some respects and under a.
different label even survive such publication.9
Must we now assume that by not even referring to the International News
case in Sears and Compco, the Court intended impliedly to overrule that
decision at least to the extent that it granted protection against actual copying
of news reports and stories after "general publication"? Or, are we justified
in taking the position that the actual precedential scope of the decisions should
be limited to the specific facts before the Court, their broad dicta notwith-
standing?
It already seems apparent from judicial developments during the past six
months that those competitors and traders who considered Sears and Compco
the Magna Carta for all sorts of unfair business conduct have-thus far, at
least-not found much encouragement in either federal or state courts.
I. IMPLICATIONS FOR THrE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
While neither Sears nor Compco involved questions of statutory or com-
mon-law copyright, the Court's opinions in both cases unfortunately make
certain broad observations with regard to the relationship between federal
copyright law and state law of unfair competition that have immediately caused
widespread confusion and misapprehension. It thus becomes particularly
important not to be misguided by the Court's dicta with regard to copyright
and the lack of any suggestion that different legal standards may have to be
applied and important distinctions made concerning both works outside the
scope of "writings" under the Constitution and works, which, while within
its scope, have not been specifically included in the list of copyrightable subject
matter under the Act of 1909. In the very first sentence of the Sears opinion
Justice Black states the issue before the Court to be whether a state unfair
competition law may "prohibit the copying of an article which is protected
by neither a federal patent nor a copyright."'0 After discussing patent policy
and history, he reaches the conclusion that "because of the federal patent laws
a State may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit
the copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying."" There
is no indication in either opinion whether this pronouncement was intended
8. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1959).
9. See generally Whicher, supra note 7, at 214-27.
10. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
11. Id. at 232-33. (Emphasis added.)
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to apply only to works which, under existing law, are capable of statutory
copyright or whether it was meant to include those vast controversial areas
which, though within the constitutional concept of "writings," have been held
to be outside the realm of the Act of 1909-for example, phonograph records
and artistic contributions of performers.1
2
As a result of this uncertainty, the rights of record manufacturers against
"dubbers" or other less drastic types of misappropriation-as recognized a
few years ago in the majority opinion in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp.13 -would seem to be in jeopardy. Judge Learned Hand's
famous dissent characterizing such protection as establishing a "perpetual
monopoly" may now have to be adopted though Judge Hand himself referred
to the result of his conclusion as "harsh."'14 It is submitted, however, that with
regard to this and other issues involving common law copyright, such results
can be avoided by focusing attention on Section 2 of the Copyright Act of
1909 which expressly preserves the rights of authors or proprietors of "unpub-
lished" works, "at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication,
or use" of such works.15 It is interesting to note that Justice Black, in a foot-
note reference, refers to that section as being indicative of the congressional
purpose to establish "national uniformity" ;16 there is, however, no indication
in the Court's opinion that this area may be within the state court's jurisdic-
tion not only on the basis of common-law copyright but on that of unfair
competition as well. It would seem, therefore, that with regard to the problem
of rescuing from the consequences of Sears and Compco authors of uncopy-
rightable material or of material which, while statutorily copyrightable, has
remained "unpublished," this casual footnote reference may now, for a number
of reasons, become the cornerstone of legal protection.
In the first place, Section 2 does not refer to "unpublished writings," as
stated in justice Black's footnote, but reads in terms of an "unpublished
work." It has, of course, always been clear that common-law protection may
be available for many "works" which do not qualify as "writings" under the
Constitution. Any "original intellectual creation" may be capable of common-
law copyright as long as it embodies "some creative intellectual or artistic
contribution."' 7
12. With regard to the difficult problem of the interaction of the copyright clause,
the Copyright Act of 1909 and the supremacy clause of the Constitution see Kalodner
& Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic
Property, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1088 (1959). See generally Kaplan, Performer's Right
and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69 HAv. L. REV. 409 (1956) ; U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW (Study No. 3, 1956); Note, Study
of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1263 (1956).
13. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. Id. at 667 (dissenting opinion).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1959).
16. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964).
17. Barbara A. Ringer, in her admirable study, The Unauthorized Duplication of
Sound Recordings, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFicE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW
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Secondly, and more important, it is still the prevailing rule in the United
States, despite "occasional rumblings to the contrary,"' 8 that performance of
a play or a musical work does not constitute a "dedication" of the common-
law right. Indeed, it has only recently been held that even Dr. Martin Luther
King's famous speech, "I have a dream," was still to be considered as
"unpublished" despite the fact that an estimated audience of over two hundred
thousand persons witnessed its actual delivery and millions more heard and
saw it over radio and television.' 9 Under the doctrine of Ferris v. Frohman,
the oral delivery of the speech was held not to amount to a "general
publication." 20
Many of us may have agreed with Professor Kaplan that perhaps this
rule no longer fits the "emergent and developing facts of intellectual produc-
tion"'21 of today. In the light of Sears and Cornpco, however, we should now
feel rather appreciative that this rule is still with us. Hopefully, it will assist
in carving out from the reach of these cases some of the most important
works, such as phonograph records or artists' renditions which thus will
remain within the jurisdiction of the state courts-at least, to the extent to
which such jurisdiction is based on common-law copyright. As a practical
consequence of the decisions, it would seem advisable no longer to rely
primarily on a theory of misappropriation or unfair competition in cases involv-
ing the copying of such "unpublished" works but rather to base the complaint,
wherever possible, on a charge of common-law copyright infringement.
There is already some judicial assurance that the Sears and Compco
decisions will not be permitted to interfere with effective enforcement of such
common-law rights. In a case involving a defendant's use of off-the-air
recording on phonograph records, including a network radio announcer's
wire-service based report of President Kennedy's assassination, the court
held that such activity constituted unfair competition and ruled on motion
11 (Study No. 26, 1957) distinguishes between common-law copyright and unfair com-
petition as follows:
a. A work may be protected by a common law copyright only if it constitutes
an original intellectual creation. The work need not be eligible for a statutory
copyright, but it must embody some creative intellectual or artistic contribution.
A common law copyright confers complete protection against unauthorized use,
and this protection ordinarily lasts as long as the work remains unpublished.
b. The theory of unfair competition recognizes a property right in business assets
which have been acquired by the expenditure or investment of money, skill, time,
and effort. The work need not be original, new, or creative to be protected. The
concept of unfair competition does not confer a monopoly, but protects only
against unfair use in business. It is not affected by publication.
18. Kalodner & Vance, supra note 12, at 1092; see Kaplan, Publication in Copyright
Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. RFv. 469 (1955) ; Nimmer,
Copyright Publication, 56 CoLum. L. Rav. 185 (1956); Selvin, Should Performance
Dedicate?, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1954).
19. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
20. 223 U.S. 424 (1912). For an interesting discussion of cases of this type which
should remain subject to state court protection, see Kalodner & Vance, supra note 12,
at 1091.
21. Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records,
103 U. PA. L. Rav. 469. 478 (1955).
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for reargument that nothing in Sears or Compco compelled a different result
since the record in question was an "unpublished" work subject to common-
law copyright.
22
There remained, of course, the most controversial and difficult question
whether state or federal law should determine what constitutes "publication."
According to Judge Learned Hand's decision in RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. White-
mnan 23 and his dissenting opinion in the Capitol Records case,24 public sale of
records, as distinguished from their use by broadcasters and others, should
be held "publication" under federal law. But, of course, the majority in the
Capitol Records case and other courts have reached a contrary conclusion.
Interestingly enough, in a recent case involving one of "The Beatles" records
it was held that, notwithstanding Sears and Compco, the enormous sale of the
records to the public, "unprecedented in the history of the record business, '25
did not constitute a "dedication to the public" and that defendant's reliance
on those two cases was "ill-placed" since the cases were "not applicable to
the subject matter and devious conduct of defendants."2 6 In granting injunc-
tive relief the court said:
The law of this jurisdiction is still "that, where the originator ...
of records of performances by musical artists puts those records
on public sale, his act does not constitute a dedication of the right to
copy and sell the records."
27
Even more recently, the problem arose not only with regard to phonograph
records but in connection with "publication" of architectural works. In Edgar
H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene,28 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reached the conclusion that the filing of architectural plans in accordance
with local building laws did not constitute publication; moreover, the erection
of the building itself was not a "publication" with resulting loss of common-
22. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d
726, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; see id., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809
(Sup. Ct. 1964). It is interesting to note that in the initial panic that followed the publica-
tion of the Sears and Compco decisions an experienced commentator on the staff of the
United States Law Week criticized the New York court's earlier invocation of the
doctrine of common law copyright on the ground that the court was "apparently unaware
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision of March 9 extending the doctrine of federal
preemption in patent and copyright cases." 32 U.S.L. WEEK 1143 (1964).
23. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
24. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955).
25. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553
(Sup. Ct. 1964). The apprehension with regard to the effect of the Supreme Court's
decisions on the record industry, see Spiegel, Variety: Beatles Beware!, 7 Los ANGELES
BAa BULL. 245 (1964), has thus far not been realized.
26. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., spra note 25, at 879, 252 N.Y.S.2d
at 554.
27. Id. at 882, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 556, quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1955) ; see Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner Nichols
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 279 App. Div.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
28. 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964).
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law copyright protection.29 Here again defendant strenuously argued without
avail that Sears and Compco compelled a different result. The Massachusetts
court rightly asserted:
A careful reading of these two opinions does not convince us that
they have struck down common law copyright, which protects unpub-
lished material, in those States which recognize its existence, or
deprived such States of the right to regulate it. There is a distinction
between that protection afforded under State unfair competition laws
to the unpatentable article in the public domain and the protection
extended through common law copyright to an unpublished work. 0
The approach here suggested is perhaps most conspicuously embodied in
the recent Ninth Circuit community antenna case.3 ' The court there reversed
the lower court's granting of preliminary injunctive relief on a counterclaim
based on misappropriation under the International News doctrine, as well as
on interference with contractual relations; it held that the injunction based
on unfair competition was incompatible with Sears and Compco since "only
actions for copyright infringement or such common-law actions as are con-
sistent with the primary right of public access to all in the public domain
will lie. 13 2 Toward the end of the opinion, however, the court made it quite
clear that the complaining television stations might have a remedy even in
the light of Sears and Compco if they could make a showing that some of the
programs transmitted by the community antenna were protected by statutory
copyright or by common-law copyright. The court intimated in this regard that
the mere fact of broadcasting did not constitute "publication," so that if the copy-
right proprietor were joined as a party plaintiff on the counter-claim, a cause of
action might lie. The stations were given permission to file an amended plead-
ing in the event that any material subject to statutory or common-law copyright
had been included in the broadcasts.3 3
Thus far, we have considered the possible effect of Sears and Cornpco
on "unpublished" works that are subject to common-law copyright protection.
But query: what will be the status of those works of the applied arts which
fall within the "twilight zone" established since Mazer v. Stein34 by the Copy-
right Office regulations with regard to the ornamental features of works of
29. With regard to the effect of filing of architectural plans, a Florida federal district
court had previously reached a contrary conclusion in DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald,
213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962).
30. Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1964).
31. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), rcversing 211
F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962) ; see notes 87-89 infra and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 350.
33. At the time of writing, a petition for rehearing by the stations is pending in
the Ninth Circuit The present case was one of a series brought to test the rights of
community antenna services to pick up the broadcasts of regularly licensed television
stations for commercial distribution to their subscribers. See Intermountain Broadcasting
& Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961), 61 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1523; RahI, The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 56 (1962).
34. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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artistic craftmanship ?5 In other words, what might have been the result if it
could possibly have been argued that both the Stiffel and Day-Brite lamps
also included artistic features that might have justified the placing of a copy-
right notice on the articles, instead of leading to an abortive attempt to seek
design patent protection? While in Sears and Compco no such copyrightable
elements were present, the cases would now seem to suggest, as a practical
matter, the advisability of asserting a claim to copyright by adding the
appropriate notice. There would then exist at least a fighting chance that such
claim to copyright in artistic features of articles of manufacture might be
upheld under the extremely liberal rules of the Copyright Office and of recent
court decisions in textile fabrics, costume jewelry, and other related cases.3 6
Without this notice and in the absence of a valid design patent, competitors
would have complete carte blanche under Sears and Compco to manufacture
exact copies of such products and, conceivably, even use the same molds.37 In
35. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1960) presently provides:
(a) General: This class includes published or unpublished works of artistic
craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned. . .. (c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its
utility, the fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify
it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates
features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art,
such features will be eligible for registration.
36. See, e.g., H. M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1963);
Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Helfat, Copyright Protection for Fashions, 3 PUBLISHING, ENTERTAINMENT, ADVERTISING
AND ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 173 (1963) ; Jackson, Unfair Competition by Product Simulation
v. Copyright Protection for Designs, 45 J. PAr. OFF. Soc'y 422 (1963) ; Silverman, The
Scope of Protection of Copyrights and Design Patents in the United States, 24 U. PITT.
L. REv. 21 (1962).
37. In effect this happened in Wolf & Vine, Inc. v. Pioneer Display Fixtures Co.,
142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24, 1964), where the plaintiff had developed a
highly successful new type of mannequin that, according to the court, differed markedly
from other dress forms then in use. It was found that plaintiff's creation required "the use
of highly skilled artistic talent and was costly to plaintiff in terms of both time and
money," that defendant came into possession of some of plaintiff's models, made production
line molds and offered the mannequins at a substantially lower price. Although plaintiff's
models were copied down to the smallest detail, no relief was granted in the absence of
palming off. The court's decision was buttressed by reference to Sears and Compco, which
would prohibit a state court from granting protection in case of such unpatented or un-
copyrighted articles. The same result was reached in Kingsway, Inc. v. Werner, 142
U.S.P.Q. 320 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 1964), in which defendant copied not only plaintiff's
artistically created set of chessmen, but even used the designation "Florentine," which
plaintiff had chosen as its trademark but which was held to have not been so used.
Query: Should plaintiffs in situations such as these not be advised at least to try to lay
a foundation for a statutory claim to copyright under 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1960)? See
note 35 supra.
In the very recent case of Titelock Carpet Strip Co. v. Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 24, 1964) the defendant not only copied plaintiff's machine "in practically
all details" but was a former employee who had gained access to the premises under the
guise of seeking to purchase parts of plaintiff's machine as scrap, when in fact he intended
to use these parts for purposes of reconstruction. Although acknowledging that "many
hundreds of hours of effort" went into plaintiff's project before he had produced an
economically effective machine, and that the defendant had obtained "for free" the ad-
vantage of all of this experimental effort, cost and time expenditure, the plaintiff was left
without any relief (aside from an amount of $250 as estimated value of the misappropriated
scrap parts). Citing Sears and Compco, the court held defendant's conduct, "if a wrong,"
to be actionable only under the patent laws.
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any event, it would now seem imperative as a result of the tvo cases that
Congress enact, in the immediate future, the pending Design Bill.88 This
proposed legislation would provide a relatively short term of federal protection
for those industrial designs which would have little or no chance today to be
validly protected by design patent and which now have lost any prospect of
being protected against slavish imitation under the law of unfair competition.8
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS
It has already become apparent that the sweeping dicta in Sears and
Compco may also have some reverberations in connection with registration of
trademarks, though the opinions themselves refer to alleged conflict with state
law only. Justice Black observed that proof of secondary meaning of a "con-
figuration of the article" identifying the maker to the trade can under no
circumstances result in a prohibition of copying or selling.40 This conclusion
will not easily be reconciled with Section 23 of the Trademark Act of 1946,
which permits registration of so-called "configurations of goods" on the Sup-
plemental Register even in the absence of secondary meaning, provided they
are "capable of distinguishing" ;41 indeed, present indications are that such
configurations may in the not too distant future be permitted registration on
the Principal Register under Section 2 (f) 42 in cases where secondary meaning
is proven. It was a strange coincidence that only three days after Sears and
Compco the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held in the Mogen David
case that the conformation of a wine bottle was not ineligible for registration
on the Principal Register as a matter of law because of the subsistence of
a design patent, but that such configuration may qualify for registration even
on that register if it could be proven that, as a matter of fact, the bottle had
acquired distinctiveness.43 The court, speaking through Judge Almond, said
inter alia:
In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair
38. S. 776, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) was passed by the Senate and sent to the
House on Dec. 6, 1963. See S. REP. No. 686, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Hearings were
held on this bill and its House counterparts (H.R. 5523 H.R. 769 and H.R. 323) before
the House Committee on the Judiciary on Dec. 12, 1963. For the' origin and analysis of
the design protection bills, see Latman, The New Design Protection Proposals before
Congress, 8 BuLL. COPYMGHT Soc'y 356 (1961).
39. It may be noted in passing that in one recent case, International Biotical Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), plaintiff, seeking a
preliminary injunction for design patent infringement and unfair competition, argued
that the court should be prepared to issue preliminary injunctive relief in patent infringe-
ment cases even where there had been no adjudication of the validity of the patent. The
court, however, refused to go along with plaintiff's theory that, in the light of Sears and
Compco, the presumptive validity of the patent should be afforded greater significance than
had been given it prior to those decisions.
40. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
41. 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1959).
42. 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1959).
43. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. (Patents)
1964) ; see Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act of 1946, U.S.P.Q., Aug. 10, 1964, pt. II, p. 1.
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competition, which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a
design patent, do not "extend" the patent monopoly. They exist
independently of it, under different law and for different reasons.
The termination of either has no legal effect on the continuance of the
other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The trademark rights
do not extend it. We know of no provision of patent law, statutory
or otherwise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy
the subject matter of any expired patent. Patent expiration is nothing
more than the cessation of the patentee's right to exclude held under
the patent law. Conversely, trademarks conceivably could end
through non use during the life of a patent.44
It will be immediately noted that, according to this statement, there may be
rights under the law of unfair competition, in addition to trademark rights,
which may extend beyond the expiration of the patent and which may thus
result in a theoretically perpetual monopoly of a configuration that ordinarily
would be dedicated to the public upon expiration of the patent.45
It is submitted, however, that a real conflict would only arise in situa-
tions-if there be any-involving the entire configuration of the article, as
distinguished from its package, container or distinctive dress. We must not
overlook the fact that in cases like Mogen David, the manufacturer did not
seek to register the shape of the bottle for containers as such, but as a trade-
mark for wine on the ground that the bottle had acquired distinctiveness with
regard to that particular product. Presumably it was for this reason that in
Mogen David the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals denied a motion for
rehearing based on an alleged conflict with Sears and Compco.
Nevertheless, if we were to go just one step further and hold the configura-
tion of the entire article registrable on the ground that the public may
recognize its manufacturer from the overall shape of the product, we would
run head on into conflict with the "limited times" patent and copyright clause
of the Constitution. In other words, the fact that a six-year old child may
recognize an automobile from its contours should not provide a basis for any
kind of trademark registration of such contours, either on the Supplemental
or on the Principal Register.46 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had
previously recognized this distinction in the Deister case,47 when it held that
a configuration in the form of a rhomboidal outline for a table was unregistrable
on either register because, if registration were permitted, the result would be
a perpetual monopoly in a utilitarian or functional feature of an article of
commerce. Said judge Rich:
It is basic to our consideration, therefore, that the socio-economic
44. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., supra note 43, at 930. (Emphasis added.)
45. Cf. Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by Patent, Trademark,
Copyright and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product Simulation
Law, 54 TRADFwAR RFP. 413 (1964).
46. See Derenberg, Copright No-Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic
Property, in 1953 COPYRIGHT PRODLMS ANALYZED 215 (Kupferman ed. 1953).
47. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 952, 289 F.2d 496 (1961).
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policy supported by the general law is the encouragement of competi-
tion by all fair means, and that encompasses the right to copy, very
broadly interpreted, except where copying is lawfully prevented by a
copyright or patent.
48
For this reason, even a "de facto secondary meaning" of an entire configura-
tion or one particular functional feature thereof must under all circumstances
remain outside the scope of the trademark law.40 This had been the view
expressed in the first decision by the Assistant Commissioner of Patents on
the alleged registrability of a configuration (headlights of a locomotive). He
correctly stated that the overall design of an article in its entirety could never
function as a trademark. 50 If this principle had not been established, the
configuration and position of the lighting equipment involved in that case
might have furnished a basis for indefinite "trademark" protection. At the
same time, the copyright protection of the lamp base involved in Mager v.
Stein5' would be limited to a maximum of 56 years, and the lamps involved
in Sears and Compco vould not be entitled to any protection at all-though
the public may, in due course, become accustomed to associating the Stiffel
pole lamp with this particular manufacturer. It thus becomes even clearer now
than it had been before Sears and Compco that entire ornamental or utilitarian
"configurations of goods," as distinguished from certain characteristic and
distinctive markings thereon (as, for instance, a "V" design or a 3-pointed
star on the hood of an automobile), should be held ineligible for registration
under the Trademark Act of 1946. Unlike the Mogen David bottle, or any
other distinctive container, they should be considered incapable of "trademark"
significance as a matter of law. No other conclusion seems compatible with
the reasoning of the Supreme Court's opinions.5 2
However, apparently the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals does not
share this view, at least with regard to registration on the Supplemental
Register. In August 1964, without even a passing reference to the Sears and
Compco dicta, the court reached the conclusion that an overall configuration
48. Id. at 961-62, 289 F.2d at 501.
49. See It re Shakespeare Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 969, 289 F.2d 506 (1961);
It re Bourns, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 817, 252 F.2d 579 (1958) ; id. at 821, 252 F.2d 582(1958); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1957). The Bourns
cases are particularly instructive in that the unsuccessful applicant had made an attempt
to register the configuration of an article in its entirety, both as a trademark and under the
design patent law. It was held that the appearance of applicant's potentiometer was neither
registrable on the Supplemental Register nor eligible for design patent protection.
50. Ex parte Mars Signal-Light Co., 85 U.S.P.Q. 173 (Comm'r Patents 1950).
51. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
52. Attention may be called to the following statement by Justice Black in the
Compco case:
It is true that the trial court found that the configuration of Day-Brite's fixture
identified Day-Brite to the trade because the arrangement of the ribbing had,
like a trademark, acquired a "secondary meaning" by which that particular
design was associated with Day-Brite. But if the design is not entitled to a
design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will.
376 U.S. 234 at 238. (Emphasis added.)
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which, according to an affidavit submitted by a single employee of the applicant,
had been adopted primarily to indicate origin of the goods, was "capable of
distinguishing" as a "mark" under Section 23 of the Trademark Act as long
as such shape was neither ornamental nor functional in purpose.53 The court
acknowledged that subject matter for registration on the Supplemental Register
did not have to satisfy the requirements for registration of a "trademark" on
the Principal Register under Section 2 of the act, but at the same time
observed, by way of dictum, that such "mark" may become a registrable "trade-
mark" on the Principal Register upon proof of established secondary meaning,
provided, of course, that the alleged mark has no ornamental or utilitarian
function whatsoever. It is submitted, however, that even when so limited, this
opinion is open to serious question. Very few overall configurations of goods
would pass the court's test unless a mere statement by the applicant to the
effect that the configuration was intended solely to indicate commercial origin
is held sufficient evidence of "capable of distinguishing." In light of this
decision, might the plaintiff in Compco have prevailed if instead of seeking
patent protection he had taken the position that the distinctive ribbing of his
lighting equipment was selected solely for the purpose of indicating origin
and, consequently, qualified as a "mark" under Section 23, or, possibly, even
as a "trademark" under Section 2 (f) ? The mere posing of this question would
seem to suggest a negative answer or, at least, a more conservative approach
than that reflected in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' most recent
opinion.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
We no longer recognize, since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,54 a federal law
of unfair competition beyond the confines of Section 43 (a) of the Lanham
Act. 5r Nor has the pending Unfair Commercial Activities Bill,56 which would
53. In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 839-40 (C.C.P.A. (Patents)
1964). Compare In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 48 (Trademark Trial &
Appeal Board Sept. 23, 1964) (a functional configuration, regardless of secondary mean-
ing, is unregistrable; concurring opinion urged that the shape of an article, or even the
shape of a feature, should be unregistrable as a matter of law, regardless of questions of
functionality).
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The post-Erie decisions of the state courts on unfair competi-
tion have been rightly called a "regurgitation of the state redistillation of federal pre-
cedents." Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d
Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., concurring).
55. Trademark Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1959).
56. A bill to provide civil remedies to persons damaged by unfair commercial activi-
ties in or affecting commerce, H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (Lindsay, N.Y.) ;
see Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964);
Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act, 23 OHIO ST. LJ.
110 (1962). See generally, Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the
Lanham Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259 (1948) ; Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TRADE-
MARK REP. 126 (1945). With regard to the effect of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, see Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L.J. 267 (1946) ; Kunin, Erieantompkinitis: The Malady and Its Cure, in ABA
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create a federal unfair competition law, yet been enacted into law. It is accord-
ingly imperative to consider the inroads that Sears and Compco have made on
the state law of unfair competition. Our analysis in this connection will discuss
two crucial questions:
1. What has been or may be the effect of the decisions with regard
to cases of product simulation?
2. What may the effect be on other traditional instances of unfair
competition, such as interference with contractual relations, so-
called "inverse" palming off, and other competitive torts if such
practices should involve subject matter outside the scope of special
federal statutory protection?
A. Product Simulation
The most important immediate effect of the Sears and Cornpco opinions-
particularly the latter-will result from the Court's sweeping statement that
the actual act of copying and selling unpatented or uncopyrighted products
may not be enjoined under the guise of state law of unfair competition even
if one or all of the following elements are present: the copied features of the
article are "nonfunctional" and the copied article can conveniently be made
in some other way; the copied features may have acquired a "secondary
meaning" identifying the maker to the trade; and "confusion" may have arisen
or may be likely to arise among purchasers." According to the Court, these
factors "may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law requiring such
precautions as labeling" but will under no circumstances transform the act
of copying into an unlawful or unfair act of competition. 58 It may be argued
that even this portion of the Compco opinion is dictum since the Court noted
that the trial court had found only minimal evidence of actual confusion and
appeared to look upon the copied features as clearly "functional." On the
other hand, the court of appeals-but not the trial court-had made an express
finding in Compco to the effect that the defendant's product could have been
made in some other convenient way and that the Day-Brite design had the
"capacity to identify" Day-Brite and did so identify it in the trade.0 Thus
we may be justified in concluding that, for the purpose of deciding the actual
cases before it, the Court did not have to formulate an overall general rule.
Such a rule, it is submitted, would send to its demise a vast body of law
that had been originally established by our federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, long before these decisions became part of a "distilled" state
law of unfair competition.
Regarding the well established difference between "functional" and "non-
SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, PROCEEDINGs 276 (1961) ; Zlinkoff,
Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair Conpeltilon, 42
COLum. L. REv. 955 (1942).
57. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
58. Ibid.
59. Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962).
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functional" features, it may be sufficient for present purposes to refer to the
Restatement, Torts, which defines a feature of goods as functional "if it affects
their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling or using them. '60 It is true that we must always bear in mind that
even aesthetic features, as distinguished from technical ones, may be considered
"functional" if the particular value and commercial success of the product
depend on such features. On the other hand, as was stated in the often quoted
case of Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. :61
[W]here the feature or, more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary
embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for
purposes of identification and individuality and, hence, unrelated to
basic consumer demands in connection with the product, imitation
may be forbidden where the requisite showing of secondary meamng
is made. Under such circumstances, since effective competition may
be undertaken without imitation, the law grants protection.
As far back as 1901, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, stated in Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway that the public policy
which permits the imitation of an article of commerce is without relevance to
the dress in which the article is marketed.
[T]he label or ornament is a relatively small and incidental affair,
which would not exist at all, or at least would not exist in that shape
but for the intent to deceive; whereas the instrument sold is made
as it is, partly at least, because of a supposed or established desire
of the public for instruments in that form.62
The cases are legion which have consistently made this important distinction.
Indeed, as has already been indicated, the decisions of the court of appeals
in Sears and Compco had been widely criticized before the cases reached the
Supreme Court, on the ground that the appellate court had not properly con-
sidered the functional-nonfunctional distinction and had gone beyond the
necessities of the case in granting broad injunctive relief.63 It would indeed
be regrettable if the elaborate study published in the Columbia Law Review
shortly before the Supreme Court decisions-devoted solely to the problem
of functionality-must now be relegated to limbo.64 Moreover, the eradication
of this distinction would seem to overlook the fact that the public interest in
free competition will be completely satisfied as long as competitors are per-
mitted to "practice the invention" after expiration of the patent, or to copy the
basic technical features of an unpatented article without copying those numer-
60. RESTATEmENT, TORTS, § 742 (1938).
61. 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
62. 178 Mass. 83, 91, 59 N.E. 667, 671 (1901).
63. See Note, Product Appearance in the Law of Unfair Competition--Preemption
or Protection?, 73 YALE L.J. 389 (1963).
64. Note, Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 CoLum. L. REv.
544 (1964). See also Pollack, A Projection for the Revaluation of Unfair Competition,
13 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1952).
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ous collateral features which lie outside the scope of any patent or copyright
protection. No legitimate excuse can be found for slavish copying of such
features in those hundreds of cases in which competitors deliberately copy
package design, color, sizes, catalog numbers, and many other elements, for
the sole purpose of imitating as closely as possible the originator's merchandise.
I do not subscribe to the extreme view presented in a recent and scholarly
article that "limiting competition by preserving specific consumer source
associations in otherwise unprotectable symbols flies in the face of the basic
postulate that competition is worth more than it costs."' 0 The author went
so far as to say, a few months prior to the Supreme Court's decisions, that
"if legal-economic policy is based on competition, and if the essence of com-
petition is copying, then courts should rarely forbid competitors to copy
methods of product differentiation such as product and package design and
configuration, even if a particular court believes consumers regard a method
of differentiation as a symbol of origin."60 Nor do I believe that it should
always be an answer to a charge of deliberate copying of color, shape and
other nonfunctional features that the competitor's name may appear somewhere
on his product and that the "literacy rate is high enough in the United States,
after all, to justify the courts in requiring consumers who care about source
to read names on labels." 67 Most of us are or should be aware that even
literate people are in the habit of remembering products by their outer appear-
ance and would be likely to repurchase them by their appearance, even though
the manufacturer's name had been forgotten. Indeed, talking in terms of palm-
ing off, it would not go too far to say that such a charge may be based and
sustained on proof of copying even if the competitor's name were legibly placed
on his product.
This last observation leads, of course, immediately to the next question
on which even more precedents and literature exist-the question of "second-
ary meaning" in product simulation cases. It is true that the prevailing view,
before Sears and Compco, was that copying of even nonfunctional features
would not be sufficient to sustain a charge of unfair competition unless accom-
panied by a showing that such features had acquired a secondary meaning in
the sense that the purchasing public associated the product with its producer
rather than with the article itself.68 Further, it must be acknowledged that, at
least in the Second Circuit, proof of secondary meaning necessitated a showing
that the copied features themselves, as distinguished from the article as a
65. Treece, Copying Methods of Product Differentiation: Fair or Unfair Compcli-
tion?, 38 No= DAME LAW. 244, 262 (1963).
66. Ibid.
67. Id. at 261.
68. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). This was the
well known and much quoted pronouncement of Mr. Justice Brandeis which resulted in
denying relief from unfair competition in the Shredded Wheat case.
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whole, had been the source of consumer confusion.6 9 Nevertheless, before Sears
and Compco, it was established law that proof of "secondary meaning" resulted
in a prohibition of actual copying of any nonfunctional features that passed
the "secondary meaning" test. The only really controversial question that
remained unsolved before the two cases was not the legal effect of secondary
meaning, but the question of its actual proof. In other words, there still
remained uncertainty whether, in certain cases of well-known configurations,
a finding of secondary meaning could not be "implied" even if no affirmative
proof substantiating it were offered. This was in essence the famous Rushmore
doctrine70 (incidentally, another of the many pre-Erie federal precedents and,
as it happened, also involving a configuration of lighting equipment), which
in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co. 7 ' the same court subsequently
modified by imposing stricter requirements of proof.
The defendant has as much right to copy the "nonfunctional" features
of the article as any others, so long as they have not become asso-
ciated with the plaintiff as manufacturer or source. The critical ques-
tion of fact at the outset always is whether the public is moved in
any degree to buy the article because of its source and what are the
features by which it distinguishes that source. Unless the plaintiff
can answer this question he can take no step forward; no degree of
imitation of details is actionable in its absence.
It is true that in Sears no finding had been made to indicate that the design,
which had been invalidly patented, did in fact identify the manufacturer to the
trade, or that other choices had been available to the competitor to meet the
functional needs of the product. In Compco, however, both findings had been
made and even the Department of Justice acknowledged that the two cases
might have to be distinguished on this basis.72 The suggestion was disregarded
69. See American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Derenberg,
The Thirteenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 50 TRADE-
MARK RE. 773, 848-850 (1960); Developments in the Law--Competitive Torts, 77
HARv. L. Rxv. 888, 915-18 (1964); cf. Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H.G. Salzman, Inc.,
302 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962); Blisscraft v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1961).
70. Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1908).
71. 247 Fed. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917).
72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 14, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The Department's brief said, inter alia:
We may thus lay to one side such questions as whether state law may protect
a performer in the performance of a copyrighted or uncopyrighted literary or
musical work, whether a State may grant relief against systematic and widespread
copying or "misappropriation" of the essential methods and operations of a busi-
ness, whether a State may prohibit the copying of features of a product which
have no utilitarian or esthetic function but are arbitrarily designed to identify
the manufacturer, and whether a State may define what constitutes "publication"
within the meaning of the copyright laws. For the policy considerations involved
in the resolution of those issues may be different than those in the present cases,
and the problems of federalism posed may call for a different balancing of federal
and State interests.
Id. at 11. (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, the Department went even further in admitting that at least in the Compco
case, the lower court may have been legally justified in granting some relief against unfair
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in the Supreme Court opinions. It remains to be pointed out that contrary to
the Court's observations, actual or likely consumer confusion always has been
and, it is hoped, will remain a relevant factor in all instances of simulation
of nonfunctional features that have acquired a secondary meaning.
Finally, the Court's statement that product simulation was not to be
prohibited "regardless of the copier's motives"173 would seem to be a dangerous
and disturbing pronouncement in a field of law dealing with "unfair" business
conduct. As Justice Brandeis noted over forty years ago:
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and
to predict consequences. 74
Justice Harlan based his brief concurring opinion on this ground, suggesting
that "more leeway" should be allowed the states in cases of copying "with the
dominant purpose and effect of palming off."7 5
B. Other Types of Unfair Trading
Before the ink on the present writing had dried, the Second Circuit, early
in August 1964, handed down its decision in Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexi-
tized Corp.70 There, the plaintiff manufacturer had developed a flexible collar
stay for which the trademark "Flexitized" was coined. Efforts to secure patent
protection for the product had been unsuccessful but plaintiff succeeded in
registering "Flexitized" as a trademark. The defendants were sued for breach
of an exclusive distributor's contract and for trademark infringement and
unfair competition. The breach of contract cause of action was tried before
a jury which found defendant guilty; on the issue of trademark infringement,
both the lower court and the appellate court reached the doubtful conclusion
that "Flexitized" was a descriptive term that had not yet acquired a "secondary
meaning." Consequently, plaintiff's claim for trademark infringement was dis-
missed by both courts.77 Plaintiff's charge of unfair competition, however, was
sustained, and the appellate court, contrary to the lower court, held the plaintiff
entitled even to an accounting of profits. Judge Waterman, speaking for a
competition. "Under the foregoing standards, we conclude: (1) that the district court's
findings in the Compco case, upheld by the court of appeals, justified relief against the
unfair competition found...." Id. at 14. (Emphasis added.)
73. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co., supra note 72, at 238.
74. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
75. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964).
76. 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964).
77. In the writer's opinion, plaintiff's registered mark should have been upheld as
"suggestive." In that event there would, of course, have been no necessity to establish
secondary meaning and the court would have lent effect to the statutory presumption of
validity of the registration, rather than go out of its way to tear the mark apart and fini
the individual elements to be descriptive.
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unanimous court, emphasized that the law of New York governed the unfair
competition claim, even when appended to a trademark infringement charge.78
State law would govern, according to the court, regardless of whether federal
jurisdiction rested on trademark infringement alone or was also based, as in the
Flexitized case, on diversity of citizenship. In applying New York law of unfair
competition, the court granted relief even in the absence of "secondary meaning"
on a theory of misappropriation derived from the Supreme Court's decision in
the International News case. 79 Quoting the well-known case of Dior v. Milton,s0
the court held that relief should be available, even in the absence of palming
off or fraud on the public, in cases involving "misappropriation" for the com-
mercial advantage of one person of a benefit or property right belonging to
another. According to the court, relief was appropriate in such cases under
New York law without a showing of secondary meaning.81 Be that as it may,
the real point of interest in the context of this article is a footnote reference
to the Sears case, briefly stating that the decision did not establish "any con-
stitutional bar to the application of state law in the instant case."8 2 The foot-
note then refers to that part of the Sears opinion that had upheld the states'
prerogative of protecting businesses "in the use of their trademark, labels,
or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by
imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of
the goods."8s3 It should be recalled at this point that the appellate court in
Sears and Compco had justified the granting of relief in product simulation
cases in the absence of palming off by referring to an Illinois trade name case ;84
the Supreme Court, however, made it clear that there was no room for ex-
tension of the trade name rule to cases involving product simulation, since the
alleged conflict with federal patent or copyright policy would not be present in
trademark or trade name litigation.
I submit that the Flexitized case should have been decided on a theory
of "misrepresentation" and infringement, rather than "misappropriation," so
that the question would still be open what position the New York State courts
would be likely to take if confronted with a typical misappropriation case
outside the realm of product simulation. It would seem from the few
precedents thus far available (other than the Flexitized case) that the state
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1959).
79. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
80. 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156
N.Y.S.2d 996 (Ist Dep't 1956).
81. It is difficult to follow the Court's reasoning in finding no secondary meaning
since the trial court had expressly found that "Flexitized" had acquired a public familiarity
which made prospective purchasers more likely to buy products connected with that name.
Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 214 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), reed,
335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964).
82. 335 F.2d at 781 n.4.
83. Ibid., quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
84. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962)
citing Investor's Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 378fII. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754 (1941).
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courts may not necessarily consider Sears and Compco as a bar to granting
relief in cases of this sort. The recent case of Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v.
United Artists Corp.,8 5 may serve as a pertinent illustration. Plaintiff there
alleged that the defendant had distributed and exhibited a television program
which included a "substantial segment" of a motion picture to which plaintiff
had acquired exclusive rights. Defendant's allegation that, in the absence of
copyright protection, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, was rejected
on the ground that the present case did not involve-an act of "copying" but
one of "appropriation" and that the property right asserted by plaintiff fell
outside the scope of the federal copyright law. With regard to Sears and
Compco, Judge Hecht held that "these recent decisions which involved dis-
tinguishable factual situations" had not "wiped clean the slate of precedent and
empowered the unauthorized appropriation of artistic performances to the
profit of others."8 6
On the other hand, a different wind seems to be blowing from the
direction of the Ninth Circuit. In the community antenna case,8 7 the court
of appeals reversed a lower court decision. The lower court's order had
protected a local television station by preliminary injunction against tor-
tious interference with its exclusive contractual rights concerning the first
run of certain affiliated network television programs, and had also con-
sidered the activities of the community antenna operators to constitute
unfair competition. It should be noted that this particular litigation in-
volved no claims based on either statutory or common-law copyright. The
Ninth Circuit, in distinguishing the International News case on several
grounds, refused to grant the exclusive licensee relief on a theory of either
contract interference or unfair competition. The court said that "to grant
appellees relief without Congressional authorization on other grounds not
consistent with the copyright act is, in effect, to recognize a new protectible
interest."8 8 The opinion observed that common-law theories of recovery may
not be resorted to in an effort "to redeem what are in essence copyright
interests." On the contrary, "As we read Sears and Compco, . . . only actions
for copyright infringement or such common-law actions as are consistent with
the primary right of public access to all in the public domain will lie."89
The community antenna case brings to the fore still another inquiry
concerning the effect of the two Supreme Court decisions. The district
court in that case held that the activities of the community antenna not
only constituted unfair competition under the International News doctrine
85. 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 1964).
86. Id. at 462.
87. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964) ; see notes 31, 32
mepra and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 352.
89. Id. at 350.
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but that they were actionable also on the ground of interference with the
"exclusive right to the first call of entertainment programs." In other
words, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to protection against acts
of third persons which "tortiously and unfairly prevent exploitation of the
right or diminish its value."90 The appellate court reversed the district
court even in this respect with the brief-and, it is submitted, rather question-
able-observation that:
Parties by the mere expedient of an exclusive contract can not "boot-
strap" into existence rights from subject matter which at their source
lie in the public domain .... To allow these appellees relief on an
alternative ground not substantially differing in gravamen from other
relief foreclosed in operative effect by the Supreme Court's explicit
holding would be to enshrine form at the expense of substance.9 1
If this part of the decision were to remain unchallenged, we would be driven
to the conclusion that because of an alleged conflict with federal copyright
policy, many tortious competitive practices (such as bribery, breach of con-
fidence, and enticing away customers) can not be enjoined if they deal with
or are related to materials which may be copyrightable subject matter but
which are not in fact so protected under the present Copyright Act of 1909
or for which copyright has not been secured in a particular case.92 It is
hoped that, the community antenna decision notwithstanding, other courts,
federal or state, will not stretch the theory of the Sears and Compco decisions
into areas that bear no factual or legal relationship to the problem of product
simulation.
In the only other case of this type which has been decided since the
community antenna decision, we find an encouraging indication lending some
substance to the hope just expressed. In the New York World's Fair case,93
the Fair Corporation had sought and obtained a preliminary injunction re-
straining defendant from manufacturing, distributing and selling postcards,
photographs and similar items disclosing reproductions of buildings, exhibits
and various activities of the Fair, and from using the name "New York
World's Fair" in connection therewith. The court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that Sears and Compco "overrule the various state cases which accorded
a monopolistic right to be free of competition by giving the originator of an
item, having commercial value, protection against copies under the theory of
unfair competition."9 4 The court's opinion was recently upheld in a three-to-
90. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47, 60 (D. Idaho, 1962).
91. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 351, 352 (9th Cir. 1964).
92. For an interesting discussion of cases of this type, see Kalodner & Vance, The
Relation Between Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72
HARV. L. REv. 1079 (1959).
93. New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc., 141
U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 10, 1964).
94. Id. at 942.
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two decision by the Appellate Division. 5 The two dissenting judges ques-
tioned whether the Fair Corporation had established a "property right"
sufficient to permit control of the taking of photographs of the exteriors of
buildings and exhibits situated within the Fair grounds. They added the
following observation with regard to Sears and Cornpco: "Thus, if the build-
ings and exhibits, the designs of which have not been patented, could them-
selves have been copied by others, it would appear that photographic
reproductions of these buildings, and exhibits for the purpose of sale cannot
be enjoined."96 It would seem, however, that the principal issue involved was
not one of "product simulation," but a form of unfair competition based on
interference with exclusive contractual arrangements-that is, an issue which
in neither the community antenna case nor the World's Fair case justified any
reliance on the holdings or dicta in the two Supreme Court opinions.
Finally, it appears that neither Sears nor Compco is likely to have an
adverse effect on certain instances of "inverse palming off" which have re-
cently been held to come within the scope of Section 43 (a) of the Trademark
Act of 1946.11 This, at least, seems to be the conclusion reached by the New
York Court of Appeals in its recent decision in the Bongo Drum litigation. 8
It was held there that in a case of "inverse palming off," a cause of action
under Section 43(a) will lie where the defendant wrongfully uses plaintiff's
photographs for purposes of advertising his own product. It is particularly in-
teresting to note that subsequently the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
based on Sears and Compco. The trial court rightly held, however, that those
decisions should not be construed to "strike down statutory or judicial pro-
tection when such copying is accompanied by any device running afoul of
the prohibition of the Lanham Act."99
CoNcLusIoN
An attempt has been made briefly to review the severe impact which the
Sears and Cornipco decisions have had and may, in days to come, continue to
exert upon the law of unfair competition, as well as on the law dealing with
statutory protection of intellectual property. Since this effort has resulted in
a paper which may appear overlong within the framework of this symposium,
I must-reluctantly-refrain from discussing the economic philosophy under-
lying the Court's decisions in this field beyond expressing respectful disagree-
ment with the present Court's overall approach to the law of unfair
competition. While there may be room for "absolutism" in the interpretation of
95. 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964).
96. Id. at 898, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
97. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1959).
98. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 498, 197 N.E.2d 620, 248
N.Y.S.2d 223 (1964).
99. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 311, 312 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 15, 1964).
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our Constitution and the Bill of Rights, there never will be a place for in-
flexible and categorical legal principles in a branch of law which is intended
to promote fairness and equity among business competitors. 100
When in 1919, in the first case involving judicial review of the term
"unfair methods of competition" under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,' 1 an allegation was made that this phrase and the entire section
were void for indefiniteness, the court in rejecting this contention replied:
The general idea of that phrase as it appears in Constitutions and
statutes is quite well known; but we have never encountered what
purported to be an all-embracing schedule or found a specific defini-
tion that would bar the continuing processes of judicial inclusion and
exclusion based upon accumulating experience. 102
It was our Supreme Court which, in 1936, declared the phrases "fair and
open competition" and "unfair methods of trade" to be so "sufficiently definite"
that "no one need be misled as to their meaning.'1 0 3 Elsewhere, the Court
suggested that meaning had to be given to the phrase by "the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion."'1 4 And in still another leading case, the
Court defined unfair competition as "a method of competition which casts upon
one's competitors the burden of the loss of business unless they will descend to
a practice which they are under a powerful moral compulsion not to adopt.'" 5
Judge Learned Hand coined the following oft quoted formula:
The law of unfair competition has a simple rubric: an ungentlemanly
practice will be condemned so long as its condemnation will not in-
jure the consuming public more than the ungentlemanly practice
itself.100
It is my belief that too much concern for free competition tends to over-
look two other vital public interests: the interest in and necessity for the
maintenance of lawful competitive relationships between business competitors
-themselves, and the perhaps even more important interest of administering
justice in individual situations without sacrificing any of the overall public
policy of fostering free competition.
The first of these interests found eloquent recognition in the majority
100. It is for this reason that in those countries in which this branch of the law has
been most highly developed, general clauses broadly outlawing any unfair commercial acts
or practices have been in force and effect since the end of the 19th Century. Such clauses
have become an integral part of several international treaties of which the United States
is a signatory. See Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883,
art. X, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379; General Inter-American Trade-Mark Convention,
Feb. 20, 1929, art. 20, 46 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833. See also, Derenberg, The Influence
of the French Code Civil on the Modern Law of Unfair Competition, 4 Am. J. ComP. L.
1 (1955).
101. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1959).
102. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919).
103. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 196 (1936).
104. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931).
,105. FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934).
106. Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940).
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opinion in the International News case' 0 7 and was perhaps most succinctly
stated in a leading text on business ethics:
Most persons who interest themselves in problems of Business Ethics
take the view that the incidence of unfair business methods is largely
on the purchaser or consumer. Although this may be a matter of
major public interest, in view of the fact that everyone is a consumer,
such an analysis is not adequate. Indeed, most views of Business
Ethics, and of remedial legislation and adjudication, are deficient be-
cause they take into account this single interest only. As also appears
in problems concerning the broader business relationships, the inter-
ests of the competitor and of the trade should also be considered, for
the values generated by a vigorous and economically sound trade
group contribute to economic and social welfare. Whether these inter-
ests are more important than the consumer-purchaser interest, or are
as primary, remains to be seen.10 8
With regard to the second proposition, we should be guided by Judge Hand's
observation that "equity does not seek for general principle, but weighs the
opposed interests in the scales of conscience and fair dealing.''109
It may well be true that, as a general proposition, our courts are "proper-
ly reluctant" to grant relief in cases of misappropriation of unpatented
and uncopyrighted material, as the late Professor Chafee remarked in his
classic article on unfair competition." 0 But it does not follow, as he suggests,
that in the desire to stop a particular defendant, the courts "ought to stop
everybody.""' Rather it is urged that the wise judicial approach to these
problems is reflected in the observation of Chief Judge Yankwich, who toward
the end of his distinguished career, said:
By using the concept of unfair practices, the courts have not sought
to evolve absolute formulas. Rather, they have considered each case
on its separate facts, and have sought to apply to specific situations
flexible principles of equity aimed at fostering higher ethical business
practices. Such treatment is desirable, for in a growing and expanding
democratic order, changing trade conditions evolve situations that
cannot always be anticipated. 12
It may be worth noting that California, the state in which Judge Yank-
wich served, has thus far remained the only jurisdiction in our nation whose
civil code has a general prohibition against any act of unfair competition, and
expressly defines that term to include "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
practice." ' 8 Perhaps the Sears and Cornpco decisions may have served to
107. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
108. TAEUSCHi, POLICY AND ETHICS IN BusiNEss, 374 (1931).
109. Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943).
110. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1318 (1940).
111. Ibid.
112. Yankwich, Unfair Competition as an Aid to Equity in Patent, Copyright and
Trade-Mark Cases, 32 NOTRE DAME LAw. 438, 468 (1957).
113. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 3369.
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accentuate the long felt need for congressional enactment of an equally broad
and flexible federal statute.114
114. See Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1964) (testimony of Congressman Lindsay) ; id. at 15 (statement of Senator Javits);
note 55 supra and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1215 1964
RALPH S. BROWN, JR.*
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sometimes hears a different
drummer, especially in the field of trade regulation. It is consequently not
surprising that it should have taken an extreme position in the two design
imitation cases recently reversed by the Supreme Court.
Even those with the greatest respect for the dogged attempts of the
Seventh Circuit to do justice cannot deny that both the judgments of the
district court, and the affirming opinions of the court of appeals, were faulty
in major respects. First, the record gave little support for the findings of
confusion or likelihood of confusion of source; at most, there was some con-
fusion of products. Second, the legal principles applied probably did not either
reflect or foreshadow the common law of Illinois. Third, even if it is assumed
that the copying went beyond permissible limits, the remedies-an apparently
absolute prohibition of copying with damages for past copying-were exces-
sively severe. Fourth, in its zeal to enforce standards of honesty and fair
dealing, the court of appeals quite overlooked the existence of a strong public
policy that favors free access to unpatented objects and designs.
Had the Supreme Court been acting only as supervisor of the federal
system, it could probably have disposed of the cases summarily, by granting
the petition for certiorari and ordering the complaints dismissed, without cita-
tion to authority beyond a reference to the Shredded Wheat case.' However,
since the decisions purported to represent an application of Illinois law, the
Court was doubtless well-advised not to make the swift disposition that the
egregiousness of error would have permitted. Once it accepted, even though
skeptically, the lower court's assertions 2 that the law of Illinois would prohibit
copying under the circumstances of the two cases, the Supreme Court was
obviously obliged to demonstrate the fallacy of postulating such a law in the
face of the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution, the supremacy
clause, and a statutory policy established early in the history of the republic.8
One might wish that the exposition had been a little more ample. Both
decisions, with considerable repetition unavoidable because Sears and Cornpco
were separately decided, take up a total of only fourteen pages. Any statement
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B., Yale, 1935; LL.B.,
1939.
1. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
2. Derived more from other recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit than from inde-
pendent Illinois sources. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 227 n.2(1964) ; cf. Note, 73 YALE L.J. 389, 392 (1963).
3. The first patent Act was passed in 1790. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
The next patent law, of 1793, required federal patentees to relinquish state patents obtained
under the Confederation. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 7, 1 Stat. 322. This enactment
presumably ended an initial period of uncertainty. There are instances of inventors seek-
ing both state and federal patents in the first years of the republic. See 1 WALKERt,
PATENTS 53-55 (2d ed. Deller 1964) ; Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 166(1931).
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from the Supreme Court in the area of industrial property and unfair competi-
tion is a rare event. Only about once a decade is the Court likely to speak
on any substantial aspect of legal monopolies and competitive practices, outside
the constant barrage of antitrust and Robinson-Patman cases; most often,
difficult or controversial points are left to the inconclusive arbitrament of
the courts of appeals. Although it is disconcerting to trade regulation specialists,
the Court has many tasks more weighty than umpiring the competitive prac-
tices of manufacturers and merchants.
Nevertheless, Justice Black's companion opinions, though terse, surely
contain enough exposition to deal with the cases before the Court. The main
points of the decision are easy to state and to defend. The cases vividly
present the conflict between patent policy and the recurrent yearning for a
common law against copying. Both plaintiffs, Stiffel and Day-Brite, based
their suits primarily on their patents. Stiffel, to a considerable extent the
innovator of the popular pole lamp, was armed with both a design patent and
a mechanical patent. The basis for the mechanical patent was the means for
adjusting the pole so as to keep it upright by compression between floor and
ceiling. Prior art caused both patents to fall. Day-Brite had also intended to
obtain both design and mechanical patents on its reflectors. The Patent Office
denied the mechanical patent and awarded a design patent. The Court found,
however, that the design was responsive to mechanical requirements and
not inventive as ornament. In both cases, the patents dominated the trial
proceedings. 4
Both plaintiffs added second counts, sounding in unfair competition, that
could be dealt with by federal courts under the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion.6 In both cases, the unfair competition consisted of nothing more than the
close copying of the plaintiff's designs. There was no evidence whatever of
deliberate palming off, or of confusion of purchasers of Compco's industrial
lighting fixtures at the time of purchase. The identity of Compco was in no
way disguised; the containers and the fixtures were clearly marked. The pur-
chasers were informed industrial users, not casual customers. Some bits and
pieces of evidence indicating consumer confusion in the pole lamp case were
introduced, but, though small retail consumers were involved, its weight was
not impressive except to establish that Sears had faithfully copied the Stiffel
lamp. For that matter, so had many other sellers.
We have, then, the trial judge finding in both cases that there was no
merit in the claim of a statutory monopoly under patent, and going on to
4. See summaries of the unreported opinions of the district courts in Stiffel Co. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco
Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962). I estimate that 90% of the testimony reproduced in the
record on appeal concerned the patents.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1959).
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forbid the defendants to imitate the design. In short, he applied the same
restraint that would have been used if the patents had been valid.
Curiously, the precise point of state disability to create a patent right, or
a near-patent right, seems never to have been decided by the Court. The
question was raised in Gibbons v. Ogden, but did not need to be and was not
decided there. 6 If Congress had left this area to the states, it is not unthinkable
that a system of state protection of designs could have been brought into
being, even in the absence of common law counterparts; article I, section 8,
the patent and copyright clause, is not ineluctably preemptive. Congress, how-
ever, has exercised its patent power so continuously and pervasively that the
possibility of state intervention now seems foreclosed. 7
Freedom to copy an unpatented article or design is the corollary of the
patentee's power to prevent copying. This freedom has been upheld in the
context of the patent laws chiefly in cases where a patentee attempted, on
unfair competition grounds, to continue his monopoly after the patent had
expired. Justice Black asserts that the unpatentable article starts on the same
footing as one on which the patent has expired, it is "in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so" 8
One might argue that the analogy is imperfect, because an article (or
design) that had been the subject of a valid but expired patent may be said
to come into the public domain because of the bargain struck between the
sovereign and the patentee. The sovereign promises:
I will use my power to exclude all others from the practice of your
invention for a term of years, if you will fully disclose it. But, the
Constitution authorizes this compact only for "limited times." You
must understand that once the statutory period expires, you have
disclosed your invention to the world and anyone is free to make use
of it. Do you accept the patent on these terms ?9
In the case of an invention for which a patent is never sought, or for which
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824); id. at 165-77 (argument of counsel). The
pretermission of the question in Gibbons v. Ogden is discussed in the Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 21-22, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225(1964). My learned friend Richard Stem, Esq., commenting on it in correspondence
before the cases were decided, observed: "What a way to begin an opinion-'This case
presents the question left unresolved in Gibbons v. Ogden!"
7. There has been a comprehensive design patent statute since 1842. See 1 WALKE,,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 729-32.
One occasionally encounters assertions that the states can theoretically create patent
rights. See, e.g., 1 ROBINSOx, LAW OF PATENTS 68 (1890) ; cf. Whicher, The Ghost of
Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry Into the Constitutional Distribution of Powers Over
the Law of Literary Property in the United States, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 102 (1961) ;
id. at 194 (1962). Whicher's challenging essay includes a discussion of the patent aspects
of Gibbons v. Ogden that is directed at the persistence of state power to protect literary
property. The degree of preemption in copyright is obviously less than in patents, if only
because the Copyright Act § 2, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1959), specifically saves common-law rights
in an "unpublished wor'--a category of extensive scope. His occasional suggestions of
common-law rights in inventions apparently relate to nonfunctional aspects, or to dis-
coveries that can be practiced without being disclosed, i.e., secret processes. Id. at 195-99.
8. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
9. Cf. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933).
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a patent is denied, or for which a patent is granted and then judicially with-
drawn, the bargain cannot be said to have been effected.1 0 But, even if the case
of an expired patent is an imperfect analogy, the result should not be altered
when the design has never been validly patented at all. We are simply remitted
to the first principle that everyone is free to imitate any article of commerce
that is in public use, unless the article's originator has the protection of a
patent, or a copyright.1
Unless one chooses to assail the whole concept of freedom of itnitative
competition, the Court's general conclusion, as stated in the Sears opinion,
seems to be unassailable:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent
the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance
to be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the
public something which federal law has said belongs to the public.
The result would be that while federal law grants only 14 or 17 years'
protection to genuine inventions, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, States
could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to
merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This
would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to
be tolerated.' 2
To support this conclusion, one need not labor the incongruity that the injunc-
tion creates a perpetual ban while the statutory grant is limited in its duration.
Assume that a state court (or a federal court applying state law), mindful
of the "limited times" obligation, awards an injunction that would expire at
the end of a period no longer than the plaintiffs would have enjoyed under a
patent. The encroachment on the national domain of such judicial legislation
would be even more apparent. The same conclusion holds if a state legislature
establishes a rule of protection for a "limited time."
After this basic statement, Justice Black's opinions for the Court move to
new and more debatable ground. In the course of considering the possible
scope for a state law of unfair competition when the federal policy authorizes
free copying he advances several familiar propositions:
A State of course has power to impose liability upon those who,
knowing that the public is relying upon an original manufacturer's
reputation for quality and integrity, deceive the public by palming
off their copies as the original. 13
[More specifically, the state] may protect businesses in the use of
their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of
10. Unless one wants to argue that the act of applying for a patent, or of accepting apatent later invalidated, implies a consent to dedication if the patent is denied. It seems
unnecessary to pursue such interesting but strained points, for the reason asserted in the
next paragraph.
11. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.12. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
13. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964).
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goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from mis-
leading purchasers as to the source of the goods.14
All this is utterly orthodox. Indeed, it may be too conventional for those who
are impatient with the classic notion that a buyer's preference for a known
source is the beginning and end of the prohibition against palming off. We
need not be detained by these difficulties. Like similar doctrinal statements by
state courts, this old-fashioned concern for the maker's "reputation for quality
and integrity" can be stretched to include the case where the identity of the
manufacturer is unknown, but there is a consumer desire to purchase goods
coming from a reliable though unidentified source. The Court's concise state-
ment of the common-law principle can also be expanded to include some
protection from the use of a mark or label on products that differ from those
produced by the first user of the mark, on the rationale that such use may still
have a harmful effect on the reputation of the first user, or on his reasonable
expansion into new markets.
These issues on the scope of trademark protection were not before the
Court, and it is not profitable to speculate at length on what the Court's prob-
able response to them might be. Once questions about the limits of state
palming off protection move from the orbit of patent and copyright, they come
into the relatively weak gravitational field of federal trademark law, a statutory
expression that reflects a fairly wide range of common-law doctrines and does
not at the present time exert much preemptive force,;
Where, then, is the new ground in the Court's opinion? It lies in the
repudiation of a familiar rule that prohibited the copying of aspects of a design
that were found to be distinctive of the source of the goods, that is, to have a
significance similar to that of a trademark. The recognition of trademark
significance in design features is an application of the doctrine of "secondary
meaning"--a configuration, or an ornament, or a color combination, though
primarily part of the design, may subsequently come to identify the source and
thus be protected. But such protection was qualified by a recognition that it
would be inappropriate to permit the "functional" aspects of the design to
serve in place of a trademark. A prohibition against "functional" copying
would effectively create a monopoly in the essence of the design even though
it was ineligible for patent or copyright protection. Therefore the courts have
generally restricted the recognition of this trademark-like interest to "nonfunc-
tional" parts of the design.
The attempt to give meaning to "functional" and "nonfunctional" in this
context has been full of difficulties. 1' It seems clear, however, that the Supreme
14. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). (Footnote omitted.)
15. See KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND OTHER
Topics 613-14 (1960).16. Fully explored in Note, 64 COLUM. L. Rxv. 544, 568 (1964) : "Courts have reached
contrary conclusions on virtually every relevant proposition."
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Court has put an end to this rather engaging form of disputation, by pre-
cluding any ban on copying a design that has no federal statutory protection.
This conclusion, which is the one novelty in the cases, is bluntly stated in the
Compco opinion. It was not necessary to the Sears case, because no showing
was made there that the appearance of the pole lamp had yet come to signify
Stiffel as the source. On the other hand, in Compco there was a finding-
questionable on the record, but nevertheless a finding-that the appearance
of Day-Brite's reflector did identify the product to the trade as coming from
Day-Brite. This finding, and the conclusion by the court of appeals that it
entitled Day-Brite to exclude others from using the design, created the oc-
casion for the following declaration by the Supreme Court:
That an article copied from an unpatented article couid be made in
some other way, that the design is "non-functional" and not essential
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied
may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the maker to the
trade, or that there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence
in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; how-
ever, and regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting
the actual acts of copying and selling.17
What has the Court swept away with this holding? Clearly, the whole
body of decisional law that, with respect to product imitation, struggled with
questions of functionality. Could, for example, aesthetic appeal be considered
functional, or could only utilitarian aspects of a design ?18 Gone also are ques-
tions of definition and proof of secondary meaning. It is really idle to ask if
anything is left of the old learning in the interstices of the excluded factors,
because the decision is emphatic that neither those factors "nor any others" can
be used to prohibit copying. We may more usefully ask what, at the boundaries
of the fissure created by this lightning stroke, is left for decision by lower
courts, and for argument by plaintiffs who still wistfully hope to find some way
of curbing imitators.
It appears that three peripheral problems remain. First, are there cate-
gories of goods that are so far outside the federal scheme of protection that
Congress may be said to have left them open for the creation of exclusive
rights by the states? Second, how do we distinguish between the article itself
and its trademark, label, or distinctive dress and packaging, which the Court
assures us may still be protected from confusing imitation? Third, what is the
occasion for and the scope of "such precautions as labeling?"
Before discussing these three residual problems, one should also take brief
note of the final turn of the screw in the quoted portion of the Court's opinion.
17. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
18. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) is
a useful recent discussion of this question.
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It concludes that none of the old criteria can justify a prohibition of copying
"regardless of the copier's motives." 19 This led to the only note of dissent from
any member of the Court, by Justice Harlan. He observed that if evidence be-
yond the mere act of copying shows a "dominant purpose and effect of palming
off one's goods as those of another" a state should be able to "impose reason-
able restrictions on the future 'copying' itself. Vindication of the paramount
federal interest at stake does not require a State to tolerate such specifically
oriented predatory business practices." 20 He nevertheless joined in the result
because motives were not at issue in either of the cases before the Court. The
reservation expressed by Justice Harlan has support and is not unappealing.
The Court, in pronouncing such a strong dictum, may well have had in mind
the excessive reliance on supposed bad motives in cases like American Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber.21 That case involved minutely exact copying of a ma-
chine on which the patent had expired. Judge Medina, while recognizing that
"imitation is the life blood of competition,' 22 also avowed that "morally and
ethically such practices strike a discordant note.123 He characterized the
aggressive attempts of the defendants to capture a share of the market as
"fraudulent" and prescribed an injunction ordering the defendants to distin-
guish their machines from the plaintiff's. As Judge Clark pointed out in his
vigorous dissent, the majority relied on "such emotive words as 'poach,' 'de-
ceitful,' 'fraudulent,' and 'cunningly contrived pirating,' without orientation
in specific findings," 24 to perpetuate the monopoly of an expired patent.
The persistent strain of distaste for the imitator, reflected in some judicial
opinions and in the writings of commentators, is often unaccompanied by even
a formal concession to the benefits of free competition. It perhaps justifies the
Court's complete exclusion of motive as a ground for restricting imitation.
To return to the questions that may be left for decision. First, are there
categories of articles so removed from the sphere of design patent that their
protection from imitation may be remitted to common-law principles? This
question is prompted by the case of Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp.,25 which dealt with the protectibility of a performer's rendition on
phonograph records. A Second Circuit panel agreed that such renditions were
"writings" in the sense that they could be regulated by Congress under article
I, section 8. Congress, however, had not chosen to extend copyright protection
to recordings of the performances of virtuosos. Despite Judge Learned Hand's
19. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
20. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964).21. 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959), modified, 287 F.2d 417(1961). Among recent Second Circuit decisions, this one, and Mastercrafters Clock &Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955), were aberrational and are now obsolete.
22. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, mipra note 21, at 272.
23. Id. at 271.
24. Id. at 277.
25. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
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contention, in dissent, that the renditions were "published" and were as a
constitutional matter beyond the reach of state power, the majority held that
New York law could and did provide relief against copying by a competing
record manufacturer.2 In contrast, there are other omissions from copyright
protection, notably articles of clothing, that may be taken to represent a deliber-
ate decision to withhold protection from "published" models rather than to
allow state law to control.27
No significant area of exclusion from design patent comes to mind. The
statute refers to "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture."2 8 There is no reason to believe that it should not be read to in-
clude any article of manufacture for which ornamental design would have
relevance.2 9
On the second question, whether there will be difficulties in separating
state-protectable trade symbols from nonprotectable designs, there will be mar-
ginal problems when the trademark is impressed on the article itself and has
aesthetic embellishments that merge into components of the design. Here the
courts may have to focus on the essentially verbal (occasionally pictorial)
character of a trademark and cut down attempts to enlarge the trademark so
as to take in a significant part of the design. A brief reference to contrasting
cases may help to illustrate this uncertain distinction. In the Mishawaka case80
a red circle on rubber footwear was held to be a protectable trademark device.
However, when RCA Victor claimed similar protection for the red center of its
phonograph records, where the circular form was a necessary consequence of
the shape of the record, protection was denied.31 A related marginal problem of
considerable difficulty-which I must leave to others-arises if a package de-
sign is patentable, and is also capable of trademark significance.3 2
26. Neither opinion gave proper consideration to the implications of the Copyright
Act §§ l(e), 5, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(e), 5 (1959) against permitting protection of recorded
renditions. See Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69
HARV. L. REv. 409, 430 (1956).
27. The unavailability of copyright for apparel seems unchallenged, though it lacks
adequate official rationale. There is not even an explicit denial of registrability in the
Copyright Office Regulations, in contrast to 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1960), stating the
unacceptability of phonograph records.
28. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1939).
29. A design patent has been denied where the article is concealed when in use and
where no one would care about its appearance. It re Stevens, 36 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
1017, 173 F.2d 1015 (1949) (rotary brush for vacuum cleaners) ; cf. In re Koehring, 17
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 774, 37 F.2d 421 (1930). But "article of manufacture" can include
the configuration of a machine. Id. at 776-77, 37 F.2d at 423-24. Implicit in such cases, it
seems to me, is a concern to prevent backdoor protection via design patent of inadequate
mechanical inventions, as in the instant cases. This concern creates another reason to
protect the patent system by barring state relief against imitators.
30. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 153 F.2d
662 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 722 (1946).
31. Radio Corp. of America v. Decca Records, 51 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
32. The Court accepted "distinctive dress in the packaging of goods" as an element
that can be protected against misleading imitation. Might not the distinctive dress be
eligible for a design patent? If so, should not its failure to achieve a patent leave it open
to copying, on the rationale of the instant cases? If, on the other hand, a design patent
is obtained, is the distinctive configuration or ornament not unavoidably dedicated at the
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Third, there are questions about the occasion for and the scope of "such
precautions as labeling." In the Sears opinion the Court said that labeling or
"other precautionary steps" could be required by a state "to prevent customers
from being misled as to the source.13 3 In the critical passage from the Compco
opinion, already quoted, the Court recited the considerations that, though no
longer a basis for prohibiting copying, might be "relevant evidence" in ordering
precautionary labeling. These factors included the practicality of altering the
imitation, the issue of functionality, the existence of secondary meaning, and
the likelihood of confusion. These matters may be relevant, but it should not
be necessary to consider all of them when only labeling is at issue.
One of the collateral advantages of the Court's blanket endorsement of free
imitation is that it cuts several legal knots. It would be too bad if the snarls of
functionality and secondary meaning had again to be untangled every time a
question of adequate identification of source was presented to the courts. The
refinements of these doctrines, which never quite fell into a stable pattern, were
probably unavoidable if a line had to be drawn between the imitation permitted
by national policy and that prohibited as unfair competition. However, if the
only issue open is the requirement of adequate identification of source, surely
any controversy can be settled with relative simplicity. There is no strong
policy that favors hiding a seller's identity; reluctance to identify oneself as
the source of a copy suggests that the seller would not mind being confused
with a preferred source.
In view of these considerations, a plaintiff who desires to compel a com-
petitor to identify himself should have to show no more than a likelihood of
confusion. This may be established by simple visual comparison of the two
articles, backed by evidence (witnesses who market the product should suffice)
that the field is one in which buyers have some general concern for source.
Clearly, the proposed test is an easier one than that required for a showing of
secondary meaning. Neither proof of association of the article with the
plaintiff, nor proof of motivation to buy it because it comes from the plaintiff
are necessary.3 4
end of the term? Is the dedication total, or can the patentee continue to exclude competi-
tors on the ground of likely confusion of source? This last question was answered affirma-
tively, but not satisfactorily, in Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925
(C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1964), which held that the owner of a design patent (about to expire)
on a decanter-shaped wine bottle is eligible to seek registration of the configuration of the
bottle as a trademark, and on the Principal Register. The instant cases, decided March 9,
1964, were not considered. A petition for rehearing, to Professor Derenberg's surprise(in which I join), was denied. See Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, U.S.P.Q., Aug. 10, 1964, pt. II, pp. 1, 3; cf. 328
F.2d at 932 (Rich, J., concurring). As an even smaller source of irritating fleabites,
should any weight be given to the availability of protection under the Copyright Act
§§ 4, 6, 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 6 (1959), to "prints and labels published in connection with the
sale or advertisement of articles of merchandise?"
33. 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
34. This frequently overlooked distinction-between association and motivation-is
discussed in Developments: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 912-13 (1964).
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The defendant can of course attempt to rebut the plaintiff's contention
that source labeling is desirable in the particular trade. Such rebuttal is useful
as a means of checking the trend toward meaningless differentiation of goods
when consumers neither know nor care about their source. I have in mind here
the articles of trade that are still bought simply by objectively determined grade
and description, such as Number One Winter Wheat, or Heavy Melting Scrap
Steel. The defendant can also deny that confusion is in fact likely-an issue
that is again related to the ways of the market. In Compco, it seems utterly
implausible that people who bought these industrial fixtures almost by the mile
did not know their source. But the harried housewife shopping in Sears for a
pole lamp could indeed be confused.
Once labeling is required, in appropriate cases a court might still require
the imitator not only to identify himself clearly but also to establish his sep-
arateness from the innovator with whom the design is associated by the buying
public.3 5 May a state court go even further and require the imitator to use
pejorative language about himself? For example: "This pole lamp was copied
by Sears Roebuck and Co. from the original design of Stiffel and Co. It is not
a genuine Stiffel lamp." Such extreme requirements of self-abasement should
not be permitted; they would hinder the normal competitive process. If the
cause of action to require a label is made as simple as I have suggested, then it
may also be reasonable to say that the kinds of labels that may be required
should also be simple. They should go no further than is necessary for the
elimination of confusion. They should not be the vehicle for state courts to
award prizes to minor innovators who, we should recall, have not advanced
the progress of useful arts enough to merit a patent.
Meanwhile, what about copyright? Since the two cases arose in a context
of invalid design patents, the Court's discussion properly focused on the con-
sequences of that state of affairs. Occasional references to copyright protection
were parenthetical, as has been true so far in this discussion. Actually, a broad
range of protection to commercial design, stemming somewhat paradoxically
from a decision of the Supreme Court only ten years ago in Mazer v. Stein,"6 is
currently afforded by the copyright law. Mazer held that the copyright classi-
fication of "works of art" was available for statuettes, even though they were
embodied in articles of use, specifically electric table lamps. The Copyright
Office responded to the decision as follows:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work
of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates fea-
35. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924) ; cf. Note, 64
CoLum. L. REv. 544, 566 (1964) : "It is usually sufficient if the defendant marks his goods
as conspicuously as the plaintiff's." See also Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the
Public Interest: Secondarv Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 935, 960-66 (1962).
36. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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tures, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation,
which can be identified separately and are capable of existing in-
dependently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for
registrationY'
The first sentence of the quoted part of the regulation is obviously in-
tended to avoid the extension of copyright to conceptions that are more ap-
propriate for patent protection. But the rest of it gives wide leeway for designs
that can be superimposed on a useful article. Mazer, as it has been interpreted
by the Copyright Office, opened the door to copyright protection of jewelry,
fabrics, and many other kinds of goods where design is of prime commercial
importance. It has even been extended to such objects as toy animals, specifi-
cally a representation of a chimpanzee. 8s
The conceptual foundations of copyright creation and protection have,
of course, significant differences from those of design patents. Simple originality,
rather than inventive novelty, is all that is needed to obtain a copyright. The
protection afforded is against copying and requires a finding of access to the
protected work. The possibility of independent creation is thus theoretically
open, so that the same design could be originated by another without infringing
the copyright. On the other hand, a patent protects the invention from imita-
tion even if someone else independently conceives it. In the classes of articles
that are of practical concern, these conceptual differences are not significant.
A claim of independent creation can be rebutted by inferences of access, which
in a commercial setting are usually easy to raise.
Copyrights have many advantages over patents for the innovator. They
come into being very simply, without lengthy administrative inquiries into
validity. Since there is only a modest requirement of originality, they are
usually sustained in court, in contrast to the fearful mortality of challenged
design patents.89 Their term of protection is much longer, fifty-six years as
against a maximum of fourteen for design patents.
The shortcoming of copyright is the requirement that the design must, so
to speak, be detachable from the object. Consequently the shape of an electric
toaster cannot be protected by copyright, though fanciful curlicues impressed
upon it can be-a result inimical to functionalism in design, in the sense of fit-
ness for use.
This casual survey of design protection through copyright, though
adequate for no other purpose, does serve to remind us that the Supreme Court
has not left the proponents of protection naked and afraid. It also suggests some
37. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960).
38. Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
39. From 1937 to 1960 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated 22
design patents and validated none that came before it. Amerock Corp. v. Aubrey Hard-
ware Mfg., Inc., 275 F.2d 346, 349 n.1 (7th Cir. 1960). See Derenberg, Copyright No-
Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic Property, in COPYRIGHT PRo-UMts
ANALYzED 215, 238 (Kupferman ed. 1953).
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rather serious disparities in the federal scheme. What seems clear is that the
way to smooth out disparities is through patient legislation, not through fruit-
less attempts to animate the misbegotten tort of misappropriation.40 The Lind-
say bill, I will assert dogmatically, would be a disaster. 41 Whether the Design
Protection Act42 recently passed by the Senate contributes to a more rational
system, or whether it is only a piece of patchwork, is another topic that cannot
be pursued in this Comment.
To sum up: if the unruffled view that is taken here about the effect of the
Supreme Court's decisions is at all correct, they do not change the main cur-
rent of the law, and indeed only reinforce a fundamental principle that anyone
is free to copy an unpatented article, subject to some concessions to avoid con-
fusion of source. The two decisions, as we have seen, declare that the interest
in protection from confusion can be satisfied by adequate labeling or similar
precautions. This also seems to the writer to be a reasonable result. If it
changes the law, it is only by brushing aside a set of rules that have never been
satisfactorily clarified.
The imperfect stabilization of the concept of functionality (and related
issues) probably stemmed, not from judicial obtuseness, but from the sort of
pressures typified by the Seventh Circuit decisions now reversed. The short-
comings of those decisions are not the result of ineptitude; they are rather
still another reflection of what I have several times referred to as a persistent
urge to create some general protection against copiers. That urge has never
achieved dominant expression in the cases. But it runs along like the Mani-
chean heresy, forever pitting the forces of light against the alleged forces of
darkness. Justice Brandeis laid it to rest a quarter of a century ago in the
Shredded Wheat case, when he observed that the defendant was
sharing in a market which was created by the skill and judgment
of plaintiff's predecessor and has been widely extended by vast ex-
penditures in advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair.
Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-
mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.43
Like other teachings, this lesson now has to be brought home to another
generation.
40. This tort in its judicial development has at most a "modest function" in protecting
"certain types of services of a fragile character, rather than products, whose commercial
exploitation without destruction by immediate imitation is difficult." RahI, The Right to
"Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHio, ST. L.J. 56, 57 (1962). See also Pollack, Unfair
Trading by Product Simulation: Ruele or Rankle?, id. at 74.41. H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (would establish a federal law of unfair
competition). For a sympathetic review of its shortcomings, see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 406,
437 (1961).
42. S. 776, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; see S. REP. No. 686, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.(1963) ; Latman, The New Design Protection Proposals Before Congress, 8 BULL. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'Y 356 (1961).
43. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
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The federal copyright and patent statutes provide limited protection
against the unauthorized appropriation of artistic and intellectual achieve-
ments. The common law1 embodies similar protections in certain circum-
stances, usually under the label of either "common-law copyright" or "unfair
competition." Although the two bodies of doctrine have long existed side-by-
side, the limiting effects of the federal statutes upon the operation of the
common law have never been satisfactorily understood. Specifically, when a
writing or discovery is copied without permission, it is often difficult to know
whether state law is permitted to afford relief through a finding of "unfair
competition" or whether protection must be obtained exclusively under an
applicable federal statute. Such questions are of constitutional dimension
(under the supremacy clause) and have important practical significance. The
coverage of the federal statutes is limited and, even when they do apply,
failure to satisfy their conditions and formalities may result in the irrevocable
loss of federal protection. Therefore, when state principles would otherwise
protect works which cannot or have not secured federal protection, rights
may be radically changed by a finding that the federal statutes exclusively
occupy the field.
Despite its importance, the problem has received relatively little judicial
consideration. 2 In late March, however, in the companion opinions of Sears
and Compco, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Design Patent Act
prohibits state relief against copyists found to have violated applicable state
law.4 A federal district court applying Illinois law had found "unfair com-
petition" in the defendants' copying and marketing of the plaintiffs' lighting
fixtures.5 Both defendants were enjoined from selling or attempting to sell
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., Harvard, 1954;
LL.B., 1957.
1. "Common law" is used hereinafter as an equivalent to "state law." This has been
true since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (except when the state law is
statute law). Before Erie, a good part of the relevant common law was "general law"
developed by federal courts. Indeed, the leading common-law "misappropriation" case
was decided by the Supreme Court. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215 (1918) ; see notes 26-31 infra and accompanying text. The Erie doctrine,
therefore, has probably sharpened the preemption problem, for federal courts would seem
much more likely to address themselves to the possibility of federal preemption of
individual state doctrines than of nationwide common law developed through federal
precedents.
2. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); RCA Mfg. Co.
v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940) ; Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930) ; Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting
opinion). In all of these, the relevant discussion is by Judge Learned Hand.
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (1959).
4. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) ; Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
5. Both opinions of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Miner
J.) are unreported. They are summarized in Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d
115, 116-17 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26,
27-28 (7th Cir. 1962).
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fixtures "identical to or confusingly similar to" those of the plaintiff.6 In the
court of appeals the injunctions were held to rest upon reasonable findings
of fact supporting the common-law right and consequently affirmed.7 The
Supreme Court, conceding that federal law provided no relief to the plaintiffs
since their design patents had been held invalid for want of invention, never-
theless reversed the injunctions as inconsistent with the "federal patent
system."8
The Court's opinions, both written by Justice Black, do not expressly
break new ground and are, on the facts of the two cases, limited to a specific
issue arising under the patent laws. Similar issues, however, arise under the
Copyright Act9 with regard to the protection of literary and artistic property.
The new opinions are therefore bound to have, and have already had, impor-
tant repercussions in the copyright area. The impact will probably be felt
especially in the courts of New York State where litigation concerning the
common-law tort of unfair competition has been unusually heavy.'0
The Sears and Cornpco decisions are addressed to two questions: first,
the extent to which the federal statutes preclude state protection against the
copying or duplication of the plaintiff's creation-protection which would
be equivalent to that provided by the statutes; second, the extent to which
a state, though precluded from preventing copying as such, may nevertheless
prohibit it as an incident of relief from a business tort. The Court held that
on the facts presented state protection against copying was precluded both
as a direct prohibition of duplication and as a means of preventing the de-
fendants from palming off their products as those of the plaintiff.
6. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 235 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964).
7. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
8. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958).
10. Four of the seven cases that have so far dealt with the effect of the two new
opinions on copyright law are from New York courts. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct.
1964) was a suit to enjoin the appropriation of a newscast for use on a phonograph
record commemorating President Kennedy's assassination. Sears and Compco were found
inapplicable through a distinction drawn between "copying" and "appropriation," and the
injunction was granted. Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141
U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 1, 1964) was a suit to enjoin the incorporation ofpart of plaintiff's film in defendant's new production. State power was allegedly based
on a contract. Sears and Coinpco were held inapplicajle on reasoning similar to that in
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., spra. New York
World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers Inc., 141 
U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 10, 1964), aff'd inem., 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 NI.Y.S2d 885 (2d Dep't1964) was a suit to enjoin defendant's sale of postcards incorporating unauthorized pic-
tures of the Fair. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction despite Sears and
Compco, and this was affirmed over a dissent which would have barred relief on the basis
of the new cases. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, 42 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d
553 (Sup. Ct. 1964), involved the appropriation of phonograph records. Again the injunc-tion was granted after distinguishing away Sears and Corpco. One case arising in Illinois,
Aerosol Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1964), on facts very
similar to Sears and Compco, followed the Supreme Court decisions. Cable Vision, Inc.
v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964) used the new cases to reverse an injunc-
tion granted under Idaho law against a community's appropriation of television programs
by use of an antenna. See also Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d
886 (Mass. 1964).
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To my mind, the general applicability of Sears and Cornpco to the first
of these questions is quite limited. As to the second, the potential impact is
greater. The precise rationale of the decisions, however, is unclear and pro-
vides an uncertain basis for prediction. In the following paragraphs, I shall
attempt first to set out the legal background against which the new cases are
decided, and then to explain my reasons for finding the decisions of only limited
significance.
I.
The Constitution gives Congress power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""
Congress has traditionally exercised this power through statutes granting
patents for "new and useful" inventions,' 2 copyrights for the "writings of
an author,"'.3 and, more recently, design patents for any inventive "orna-
mental design for an article of manufacture."'' 4 These federal statutes have
always operated against a background of state law. State legislation granting
copyrights and patents predated the constitutional provision, 5 and principles
of so-called common-law copyright and unfair competition have been available
to frustrate copying for many years.' 6 While state patent and copyright statutes
were formerly thought to have been preempted by the promulgation of the
federal acts,' 7 the common law was not automatically so strictly limited.
The failure of federal statutes and precedents to set out the precise limits
of common-law power left the courts in large measure free, at least in the
first instance, to explore their own prerogatives. In recent years, especially
in the copyright area, courts have occasionally bad strong incentives to develop
new modes of protection. While the Copyright Act has come to give con-
siderable protection against misappropriation of artistic effort,'8 it has been
outdistanced by important piracies which it does not prevent, but which none-
theless tend to strike sensitive judges as unjust and inequitable. The act, for
example, totally fails to provide protection against the unauthorized recording
of original performances of musical works, thus, leaving an entrepreneur free,
so far as federal law is concerned, to make and sell records of a symphony
orchestra broadcast of Mozart or Beethoven without the orchestra's permis-
11. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1959).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1959).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1959).
15. See SUBcOMM. OF PATENTS, TRADEmARE:S, & COPYRIGHT, SEN. COMM. ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No. 3, at 69 (Comm.
Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION].16. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) ; Fisher v. Star Co.,
231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921).
17. Wheaton v. Peters, mupra note 16 (by implication).
18. A general description of the steady increase of protection from the Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, to the Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075,
will be found in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No. 3, at 72-76.
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sion. Not unnaturally, the courts have shown an inclination to provide the
protection which the federal statute omits. 9
The fountainhead of state protection for literary and artistic creations
has been the state power to prevent the copying of "unpublished" writings.
Since 1909 the Copyright Act has in fact contained explicit recognition of the
"right" of the author to resort to the common law "to prevent the copying,
publication, or use" of "unpublished" works ;20 this provision undoubtedly
merely makes explicit what had previously been tacitly understood.
At one time, common-law protection against copying was strictly limited
as a matter of doctrine to such "unpublished" property and courts refused to
consider protection against copying after "publication."'21 This position, if
all could have agreed upon what constituted "publication," would have elim-
inated virtually all copyright preemption problems-at least where a state
purported to act only against copying itself. If a work were "unpublished,"
the states' power to protect against copying would be unquestioned, and if
it were "published," they would not attempt to prohibit duplication. Important
doctrinal problems could arise only with regard to unpublished works where
the author had voluntarily accepted federal statutory protection. 22 One searches
in vain, however, for an authoritative federal definition of "publication" de-
signed to put an end to state power and capable of imposing uniformity upon
the unusual range of definitions offered by the common law. A play, to take
the most famous example, is not "published" (so as to divest it of common-
law protection) by two thousand public performances, 23 though it would
probably universally be deemed "published" by the indiscriminate sale of two
hundred copies.24 Moreover, it is no longer clear that common-law courts will
automatically refuse relief upon a finding of technical "publication"; courts
in some recent cases have shown a strong disinclination to consider "pub-
lication" as totally decisive of all rights.25
To an extent not yet wholly understood, this entire area was deeply
19. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662, 664
(2d Cir. 1955) ; cf. COPYRIGHT LAW REvisiox, STuDY No. 26. Protection would be pro-
vided by the proposed Copyright Act § 1(7). See S. 3008, H.R. 11947, H.R. 12354, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1959). This express language was probably added to make it
wholly clear that negative inferences are not to be drawn from the enactment of 1909
of federal statutory protection for some classes of "unpublished" works. E.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1959) (not offered for sale).
21. See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
22. This problem arises under the present state of the law. While it has never been
authoritatively decided, indications are that authors of unpublished works will lose state
protection by voluntarily putting their work under the act. See Photo-Drama Motion
Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448 (2d Cir. 1915) (dictum).
23. See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
24. See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
25. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1955) ; Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct 1950), aff'd inenz., 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1st Dep't 1951).
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affected in 1918 by the landmark decision in International News Serv. v.
Associated Press.26 Sitting as a common-law court, in the now-defunct tradi-
tion of Swift v. Tyson,2 7 the Supreme Court awarded equitable non-statutory
relief, in very appealing competitive circumstances, against an appropriation
of news bulletins. While the bulletins were concededly "published" and there-
fore the federal copyright law might conceivably have offered protection had
it been invoked, the Court insisted that the question was one of "unfair
competition in business," and the right to prevent such competition was not
foreclosed by showing that the benefits of the Copyright Act had been
waived.28 Read liberally, International News might thus be understood to
have abolished both the self-limitation of the common law to "unpublished"
works and any preclusive effect flowing from the federal statutes after
"publication." Judge Learned Hand, for one, was immensely troubled by the
problems that the case created in the relationship between the common law
and the "scheme" which Congress had for more than a century "devised to
cover the subjett-matter. ' 29 He would have limited its authority to the situ-
ations "then at bar," because the difficulties of understanding it otherwise
were "insuperable."30 Nevertheless, the tone of the Supreme Court's decision
was bold, and in its wake have come other significant common-law expeditions
against business piracy where federal protection was deemed inadequate. 81
Until the present opinions, the Supreme Court had said nothing to impede
or approve these developments, and the legitimacy of prior cases has remained
quite uncertain.
Despite these assertions of expanding common-law power, there have
remained areas where state protection against copying has been clearly ex-
cluded. Primarily, since Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,8 2 it has been clear
that "on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist,
and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public
property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted."883 Presumably,
the "right to make the thing" includes the right to copy it as well as the right
to arrive at the result independently; the same right should attach to an ex-
26. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
27. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
28. 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
29. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930).
30. Ibid.
31. The most prominent have been Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp
221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (recorded musical performances) ; Fisher v. Star Co., 231
N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (cartoon characters), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921) ; Dior v.
Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mer., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156
N.Y.S.2d 996 (1st Dep't 1956) (dress designs) ; Metropolitan Opera Ass n, Inc. v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd Inem., 279
App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951) (recorded musical performances). For a
more recent case, see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc.,
42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (broadcaster's newscast).
32. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
33. Id. at 185.
1232 [Vol. 64: 1228
HeinOnline -- 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 1964
PRODUCT SIMULATION
pired design patent or copyright. Upon the expiration of statutory protection
one can assume that state relief against copying an article will be precluded.
The doctrine of the Singer case is not difficult. By limiting Congress'
power to that of securing rights "for limited Times," the Constitution may even
command the result. But what of patentable or copyrightable articles not
brought within the statute, either through the author's failure to seek statutory
protection or because the work cannot meet the statutory standards of in-
ventiveness or originality? With regard to these works, nothing is granted
"on condition," and the Singer analysis will not alone suffice to exclude state
power. So far as copyright is concerned, an area of uncertainty has therefore
arisen between "unpublished" works, which the states can protect, and works
upon which copyrights have expired, which clearly cannot be protected. The
new opinions obviously mean to narrow this area in favor of preemption
of state protection, but, as I shall try to show, one cannot be sure just how
much uncertainty will remain.
Given this context, we must now focus upon the second aspect of the
opinions. Where it has first been determined that the federal statutes preempt
state protection against copying, how may a satisfactory accommodation be
reached between federal preemption and state protection of interests that are
not strictly equivalent to the right to prevent copying? Specifically, the new
cases deal with the accommodation to be reached between the statutes and
the law relating to the common-law tort of palming off. The problem, how-
ever, is not peculiar to that tort.34
Palming off occurs when a seller markets his goods so as to make buyers
believe them to be the products of another.3 5 In its most blatant form, it
involves applying the trademark of another manufacturer to goods of a similar
nature made by the seller. If the trademark has been well-established, its
use by the seller will probably be enjoined. Palming off can also occur, how-
ever, through imitation of products that, especially when labels are not prom-
inent, may be so similar in appearance and packaging that the seller's goods,
without more, will confuse the purchaser into thinking he has obtained the
goods of the other manufacturer. The common law will ordinarily give pro-
34. Other areas in which copying might incidentally be prohibited are the law of
contracts, the law of defamation, principles of privacy, and principles protecting con-
fidential relationships-all of which may give rise to problems similar to that encountered
in the present cases. See, e.g., Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 382 P.2d 271,
cert. granted, 376 U.S. 905 (1964) (No. 707, 1963 Term; renumbered No. 20, 1964
Term), a case that raises the issue of the enforceability of a contract to pay for the use
of a patented machine after the term of the patent has expired (the contract having been
made while the patent was in force). Even International Vews might conceivably be
viewed as involving one of these areas where the common law does not act against
copying as such, but only incidentally prevents copying through the protection of an-
other interest. Perhaps that is what the Court had in mind when it said that the case
must turn "upon the question of unfair competition in business" rather than "upon the
general question of property in news matter at common law, or the application of the
copyright act." International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-35(1918).
35. See RESTATEMAENT (SECOND), TORTs § 712, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
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tection in the latter situation only when the appearance of the first manu-
facturer's goods has acquired a so-called "secondary" meaning-that is, where
the appearance has come to be associated in the public's mind with a particular
manufacturer.36 When a feature with secondary meaning is appropriated, the
affirmative case for relief is, on principle, the same as when an established
trademark is infringed. Unless the defendant does something to make it clear
that his goods are not those of the plaintiff, the common law will afford
protection to the public against harmful confusion concerning the source of
goods.
So long as the law of palming off applies only to appropriation of trade-
marks or trade names, but not goods, it remains a safe distance from federal
patent and copyright statutes. When palming off, however, is charged against
a defendant who copies the appearance of a product that has acquired a
secondary meaning, a genuine substantive dilemma may arise. For example,
consider a case where the plaintiff's design is covered by a design patent. The
design patent expires and immediately thereafter defendant's appropriation of
the design occurs. So far as Singer is concerned, the defendant has the "right
to make the thing"3 T-to reproduce the design. Yet as far as the common law
is concerned, the exercise of this right may result in palming off, which ordi-
narily would be enjoined as infringing a competitive interest that the
states have long been thought entitled to protect. Must the problem be solved
by having one interest override the other, or can a more accommodating
resolution be achieved?
In an analogous case, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,88 the Supreme
Court achieved an effective accommodation. The predecessor of the plaintiff,
National Biscuit Company, had acquired a mechanical patent upon the process
for making the cereal "Shredded Wheat," and had also acquired a design
patent upon the cereal's pillow-shaped biscuit form. The mechanical patent
expired; one year before the design patent would have expired, it too was
declared invalid. Thereafter, the Kellogg Company produced and sold under
its own label a product identical to NBC's cereal and called "Shredded
Wheat." NBC instituted suit and the lower federal courts ultimately restrained
Kellogg "from the use of the name SHREDDED WHEAT as its trade name; ...
from advertising or offering for sale its product in the form and shape of
plaintiff's biscuit; or from doing either."8 9
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Singer case established that, upon
the expiration of the plaintiff's patents, Kellogg had an affirmative federal
right to make the cereal by the formerly patented process and in the formerly
36. See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917)
(L. Hand, J.); cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 716, comment b (1938).
37. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
38. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
39. Id. at 115, paraphrasing National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 96 F.2d 873 (3d
Cir. 1938).
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patented pillow form. Having these rights, it also had the right to use the
generic designation of "Shredded Wheat." The Court found it necessary to
go further, however, and asserted that while the showing made did not entitle
the plaintiff to exclusive use of the term "Shredded Wheat" or the pillow-
shaped form, plaintiff was entitled "to require that the defendant use reason-
able care to inform the public of the source of its product."40 An obligation
rested upon the Kellogg Company "to identify its own product lest it be
mistaken for that of the plaintiff." 41 The Court then closely examined whether,
in fact, the Kellogg Company in exercising its rights to use the name
"Shredded Wheat" and the pillow-shaped biscuit was "doing so fairly."42 In
finding for Kellogg, the Court concluded that there was "no evidence of pass-
ing off or deception on the part of the Kellogg Company; and it has taken
every reasonable precaution to prevent confusion or the practice of deception
in the sale of its product. ' 43 Thus the Court in Kellogg seemed ready to
respond both to the federal right to copy the plaintiff's product and to the
common-law rule against palming off.44
In Kellogg, the Court relied upon the "general law" of palming off to
decide that the tort had not occurred,4 5 and it found that general law in
federal precedents.46 Since Erie, it is unlikely that a federal court would
attempt to decide such a question under its own precedents. Instead, the
common law will have to be taken from the appropriate state and is likely
to vary in substance among the states. Should palming off be found under the
applicable rule of law, the question will arise whether this independent state
rule is entitled to the same effect as the Supreme Court seemed ready to give
to the "general law" in Kellogg. The question is crucially important; it seems
clear that a state might conceivably frame a rule of palming off that would
be inconsistent with applicable federal rights and would be entitled to no
effect. Suppose, to take an extreme case, that a state evolved a rule whereby
customer confusion was conclusively presumed solely on the basis of a close
similarity between the appearance of the plaintiff's and defendant's products-
identifying labels being deemed legally irrelevant. In such a state, the federal
right to copy an article formerly covered by a patent or copyright would, in
practical terms, become a nullity-thus raising the question as to what extent
state law, allegedly based on interests different from those of patent and copy-
40. 305 U.S. at 119.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 120.
43. Id. at 122.
44. See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917)
(L. Hand, J.) (indicating that an injunction, while permitting the copying of form and
name, would have been issued to stop the palming off).
45. The Court insisted that Kellogg's right to copy the product was accompanied
by an obligation "to use reasonable care to inform the public of the source of its product."
The issue of whether Kellogg had been "fair" remained even after a finding "that
Kellogg had taken only that to which it was entitled." Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119, 120 (1938).
46. Id. at 113 n.1.
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right law, may nevertheless be forced to give way before the implications of
the federal statutes. This is the second question to which answers will be
sought in Sears and Compco.
II.
The Singer case established an affirmative federal right to copy an article
covered by an expired federal patent or copyright. Unquestionably, after Sears
and Compco, the right to copy also applies to "an unpatentable article" which
"like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and
may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."47 As to such articles,
a state may not directly interfere with the appropriation of another's creation.
How far does this new holding go? We have seen that the protection of
"unpublished" writings has been at the core of state protection against mis-
appropriation. Yet this area is one where the opinions seem clearly not to
go, for Justice Black explicitly recognizes "that section of the Copyright Act
which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings but does not
include published writings." 48 Although by emphasizing the existence of an
enlarged federal right to copy, Sears and Compco may ultimately exert some
pressure against state assertions of nonpublication, no new federal standards
of "publication" are suggested for purposes of preemption. Moreover, the
opinions, without further elaboration, really do not have a wide preemptive
result, even with respect to published works.
In the case of "published" works, the opinions emphasize the unpatentable
rather than the unpatented quality of the designs involved. Suppose, for
example, that a book-clearly the potential subject of copyright under the
act-is published without the statutory notice of copyright. Under present
law, an irrevocable loss of statutory protection would generally occur.49
Assume, arguendo, that though no state presently safeguards such a book
from copying, in an appealing case a state court did give such protection under
state law. Such a case, I assert, would not be governed by anything in either
Sears or Compco.
Sears suggests that when an article "represents too slight an advance
to be patented" it "belongs to the public." 50 This result follows if one views
either the statutes or the Constitution as reflecting a purpose, when patent
standards are not met, to achieve free commerce in design advances. But this
reasoning is irrelevant to the case which has been put because our book does
47. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). While patents
had been applied for, granted, and held invalid in both cases, these facts were clearly not
deemed determinative of the issue. If unpatentability is really the test, then the courts
may be obligated to decide whether a patent would have been valid, even though none
was sought. Curiously, Kellogg also involved an invalid design patent, but the suit there
was brought after the patent would have expired. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111 (1938).
48. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964).
49. COPYRIGHT LAw Rr s ox STUDY No. 7, at 12.
50. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
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meet federal standards; it might have been copyrighted had the statutory
formalities been observed. A wholly different argument would be required
to show why the states may not protect a patentable or copyrightable work
for which the owner has voluntarily or inadvertently omitted to obtain federal
satutory protection. Nor would the reasoning in Sears apply to resolve another
question that has never authoritatively been settled-Is state protection neces-
sarily lost when an "unpublished" work has voluntarily been placed under
the federal statute ?51 It seems clear that in neither of these cases can it auto-
matically be assumed that there is a federal right to copy. On the contrary,
upon the observance of certain formalities, there is a federal right to prevent
copying.
The Sears case contains another idea potentially useful in dealing with
this hypothetical. "States," Justice Black suggests, should not allow "perpetual
protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all under
federal constitutional standards"; that would be "too great an encroachment
on the federal patent system to be tolerated." 52 Justice Black does not describe
the nature of the "encroachment" he envisions. Suppose, in any event, that
our hypothetical state does not give perpetual protection, but limits its relief
to a short period, one no longer than that provided in the federal statute.
(Relief in International News was similarly limited in time.) It seems fair
to say that Sears and Conipco provide no immediate answer to such a case.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that I believe a state
could restrict for a limited time the right to copy our book where the federal
formalities have not been observed. To avoid this result, one might emphasize
the federal registration and deposit requirements and perhaps show how they
would be undercut by parallel state protection ;5 indeed, one might find anti-
monopoly implications in the Constitution and patent statutes. It is crucial
to observe, however, that while broad opinions generally preempting state
monopolies may well be handed down, Sears and Compco are certainly not
such opinions. They are the easy cases where the state protection was sub-
stantively inconsistent with the federal statute--the state sought to protect
an article that was unprotectable under federal law. They touch the hypo-
thetical case of parallel state protection over copyrightable or patentable arti-
cles only remotely, if at all.
Now let us narrow the consideration even further. Can we, at least, be
sure that articles which do not substantively qualify for federal protection are
immune from state misappropriation protection after "publication"? Suppose
an author creates and publishes a marvelous short title to go with a terrible
51. See Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co., Inc. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220
Fed. 448 (2d Cir. 1915) (dictum: state protection is lost).
52. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
53. But see Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) (delay
in depositing copies of a copyrighted work only postpones the right to bring suit).
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playY4 The play attracts no notice whatsover; the title, however, remains
potentially valuable. The title does not presently qualify for copyright no
matter how original, 55 and patent protection is out of the question. Suppose,
then, that a producer appropriates the title without permission and success-
fully uses it for a motion picture whose story is wholly unrelated to the play?
Can a state legitimately give the playwright damages and an injunction? Put
another way, can the negative inference that there be free commerce in titles
be drawn from the statutes, just as the Court in Sears was able to draw the
inference that there be free commerce in designs which represent "too slight
an advance to be patented" ?6
It is again submitted that this and similar questions concerning other
kinds of artistic and literary property not presently covered by the Copyright
Act must, for now, go unresolved. There is surely a basis for distinction
between what Sears involved-state protection of a design which, had it only
been more inventive, would have qualified for a patent-and a creation, like
a title or a recorded musical performance, that is wholly outside the present
scheme of federal protection. It is easy to imagine reasons why Congress may
have failed to protect musical performances from appropriation while in no
way intending to preclude the states from such protection. For instance, the
present act was passed at a time when piracy through records may not have
been an apprehended danger, or Congress may have been motivated by the
practical problems involved in registering, placing notice upon, and accepting
deposits of musical performances embodied in bulky records. As for titles,
Congress may have been motivated by a belief that they are not writings at
all in the constitutional sense.57 Still different reasons may well apply where
other kinds of property are involved. This is not to say that all state protec-
tion of articles not covered by the statutes is legitimate, but rather that there
should be an obligation upon courts in each case to ferret out why federal
protection is missing and to evaluate whether due appreciation of those rea-
sons counsels limitations upon the states. No such evaluation is to be found
in Sears and Compco. The opinions do not cite the leading cases where the
common law has acted against misappropriation of literary or artistic prop-
erty; even the Court's landmark opinion in International News is unmen-
tioned. It would not be sensible to suppose that all of these precedents have
been displaced, sub silentio, by these two decisions.
We come then to the second set of problems connected with the opinions.
Here we assume the existence of an affirmative federal right to copy a given
54. See, e.g., Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433(1950).
55. 3737 C.F.R. § 202.1 (a) (1960) ; cf. Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398(8th Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 231 U.S. 348, 755 (1913), cert. denied,
232 U.S. 724 (1914).
56. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
57. See authorities cited note 55 supra.
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creation. The question becomes whether, and to what extent, the copying of
the work may nevertheless be restricted by a state in the name of a non-
misappropriation interest that the state would ordinarily be entitled to protect.
The present cases specifically consider the permissible application of state
protection against palming off.
According to the Kellogg case, despite a federal right to copy, a defendant
has the obligation fairly to "identify its own product lest it be mistaken for
that of the plaintiff."15 8 In Kellogg, since palming off was not found, plaintiff's
competitive interest deserved no protection. In the present cases, however,
the court of appeals found that according to the trial court palming off had
taken place under applicable state law; in Illinois it was "unnecessary to prove
more than the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the products." 59
The Seventh Circuit panel concluded that the district court had reasonably
determined not only that a likelihood of confusion existed but also that some
specific confusion had in fact been proved. Thus, if Kellogg had been followed,
it would appear that some state relief, despite the defendants' federal right,
would have been proper in Sears and Compco. Nevertheless, injunctions in
both cases were reversed.
We must reject the most drastic explanation of the court's result, namely,
that Kellogg has been overruled insofar as it held that the states have a right
to prevent palming off of works which may otherwise be freely copied under
federal law. Kellogg is cited in three separate places in Justice Black's opin-
ions, and nowhere is disapproval suggested. 60
Less drastic and more plausible interpretations do not explain the result
as easily. It may be, for example, that the Court simply found the particular
injunctions in these cases too broad; both orders prohibited the defendants
from unfairly competing with plaintiff by selling or attempting to sell fixtures
"identical to or confusingly similar" to those of the plaintiff. Certainly the
portion of the injunctions that prohibited the mere act of selling "identical"
fixtures directly violates the federal right, for it is in no way tied to palming
off. And even the prohibition upon sales of "confusingly similar" fixtures goes
too far. The essence of palming off is confusion concerning source. Prohibiting
"confusingly similar" fixtures without specifying the relevant confusion could
well be construed as just another way of prohibiting copying-the one pro-
hibition that the states clearly cannot afford. However, if the injunctions were
merely too broadly framed, ordinary practice would have suggested either
that the Supreme Court narrowly interpret the decrees so as to make them
proper, or that the cases be sent back to the district court for proper injunc-
58. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938).
59. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 n.7 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
60. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230, 231 (1964).
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tions aimed solely at palming off. If palming off were taking place, the district
court could, under Kellogg, still compel the defendants to label their fixtures
clearly or otherwise distinguish them from the plaintiffs' designs. How then
are we to explain the Court's declaration that Sears was "entitled to a judg-
ment in its favor" ?"'
One explanation may be that, in the Court's view, palming off had not
occurred; thus, there was no need to consider an injunction narrowly
embodying protection against confusion. After all, this was the result in
Kellogg itself. However, after Erie it is no longer the Court's function initially
to say when common-law palming off has occurred. Since, on the basis of the
opinions themselves, we must reject the possibilities (a) that the Court has
reversed the relevant factual findings below or (b) that the Court found the
lower courts wrong in ascertaining the relevant Illinois law, 2 the Court must
mean to hold that, as applied below, Illinois law is somehow inconsistent with
the patent act-despite the fact that Illinois law responded, as in Kellogg,
to the likelihood of confusion as to product source.
The explanation for the decisions that I can offer in the face of the above
considerations is not entirely satisfactory, but goes as follows. Presented with
the decisions below, the Court was very likely irritated by, and impatient with,
the findings of palming off. From the opinions of the lower courts it could
easily have concluded that the injunctions were motivated as much by an
outright desire to prevent copying as by a desire to protect against confusion
of source; the evidence of palming off was extremely thin. More importantly,
the present cases could be considered symbolic of a trend in post-Erie state
court decisions steadily to lower the standards for finding confusion of source.
If left unchecked, this trend might ultimately attach conclusory findings to
virtually all cases of outright copying. One way to attack this problem with-
out questioning judicial motives would be to raise the evidentiary standards
for finding the relevant confusion. This, I suggest, is precisely what the Court
has done. A statement in Compco seems to sum up the Court's objection to
the decisions below: both injunctions "were based wholly on the fact that
selling an article which is an exact copy of another unpatented article is likely
to produce and did in this case produce confusion as to the source of the
article."03
61. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 60, at 233.
62. The Compco opinion, it is true, expresses concern with "the thinness of the evi-
dence to support findings of likely and actual confusion among purchasers" but goes on
to say that "we do not find it necessary in this case to determine whether there is
,'clear error' in those findings." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,
237 (1964). The same disclaimer appears applicable to Sears. As to the finding of Illinois
law below, a footnote again expresses doubt about the result below which "appears to
have extended greatly the scope of Illinois law of unfair competition beyond the limits
indicated in the Illinois cases . . . " but concludes "we need not decide whether it was
correct in doing so." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 n.7 (1964).
63. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra note 62, at 237.
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Surely it is reasonable for the Court to hold that palming off may not
be found merely on the basis of copying. Otherwise a state prohibition might
swallow up a federal right. Thus, in the administration of the federal right,
it may properly be demanded that where a state asserts confusion of source,
it must require some solid direct evidence of that confusion and not rely wholly
upon an inference to be drawn from the very copying authorized by federal
law. It is true that in both Sears and Compco there was some direct evidence
of past confusion, and I freely admit that this goes against my explanation.
Nevertheless this evidence was extremely thin, and the Court may well have
been justified in finding it insufficient. The opinions, however, contain no test
for determining the amount of direct evidence necessary to sustain a finding
of confusion, and it is unlikely that any abstract standard can be formulated.
Sears and Compco may thus create another area where, in the protection of
a federal right, it will be necessary for the Court to review particular fact
situations in a number of individual cases that of themselves have no great
intrinsic significance.
If the Court's holding is as I have just suggested, critics may argue that
the states will be unduly hampered in preventing future confusion when none
has yet occurred. One answer may be that the federal right cloaks copying
with a privilege until some specific harm can be shown; a second answer,
suggested in both opinions, might be that the states may have more freedom
to impose prophylactic specific labeling requirements upon copyists than
to act upon the basis of inferred actual confusion.64
CONCLUSION
The Sears and Compco decisions undoubtedly indicate an attitude hostile
to extensive state protection against misappropriation, deeming such matters
of primarily federal concern under relatively strict federal statutes. Because
of their limited rationale, however, the decisions say nothing of immediate
consequence regarding state protection of literary and artistic achievements
which are "unpublished" or are not embodied in categories covered by the
Copyright Act. Even in those areas where a federal right to copy does exist,
there remains the possibility that a state may incidentally prohibit copying
in order to protect a separate legitimate interest. In the specific area of state
protection against palming off, Sears and Compco again clearly show hostility,
though their rationale is obscure. To my mind, the most plausible explanation
of the cases is that they compel a state to require solid evidence of customer
confusion beyond the inferences that may arise from the similarity of goods
alone. On the one hand, I readily sympathize with the Court's apprehension
64. Id. at 238. See H.RL 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (Lindsay, N.Y.) which in
creating a federal law of unfair competition would undoubtedly solve some, but not all, of
the problems posed by Sears and Compco.
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of the danger that an expanding doctrine of palming off might, if unchecked,
swallow up affirmative federal rights to appropriate some writings and in-
ventions; on the other, the Court's obscurity in disposing of the problem seems
difficult to justify.65
65. Nor can I justify the Court's failure to accept Justice Harlan's suggestion, in
concurrence, that states should at least be able to act freely against copyists found to
intend to create confusion as to source.
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